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 Abstract  
There are few “mythical” judgments that every student of European integration has read or ought 
to have read. Dassonville is one of these judgments. The Court here makes one of its “most famous 
pronouncement[s] ever”; and yet very little historical research on where the Dassonville formula 
came from and what it was intended to mean in 1974 has yet been undertaken. The conventional 
wisdom holds that the Court offered a hyper-liberal definition of the European internal market, 
which radically dissociated itself from the conceptual shackles accepted in classic international 
trade law. According to this view, Dassonville represents the substantive law equivalent of Van 
Gend en Loos. This traditional view, it will be argued here, is simply not born out by the historical 
facts. A contextual interpretation indeed shows a very different meaning of Dassonville; and a 
closer author-centric analysis reveals a very different understanding of the Dassonville formula 
in its historical context. What does this “re-reading” mean for our understanding of European law 
and its history? Not only is a re-reading of the “classics” an obligation for every generation of 
young European lawyers; more importantly still: in order to understand the history of European 
law, we must try to reconstruct the – doctrinal – context to each classic case.  
Keywords 
Dassonville, Article 34, “directly or indirectly, actually or potentially”, mixed situations, rule of 
reason 
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Introduction* 
There are few “mythical” judgments that every serious student of European integration has read 
or ought to have read.1 Journal articles will analyse them, academic textbooks will sanctify them; 
and, sometimes, broader theoretical superstructures will arise from them.2  
The Dassonville judgment of the European Court of Justice is one of these judgments. It is, 
quantitatively, the second most-cited case in the history of European Union law; 3  and, 
qualitatively, it is – for a great number of scholars – the most important judgment ever decided 
on the internal market.4 The meaning of the judgment is thereby often condensed into a famous 
“formula” that has come to define which national laws constitute illegal barriers to intra-Union 
trade in goods. The “Dassonville formula” has here come to define the scope of Article 34 TFEU, 
according to which all “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effect shall be prohibited between Member States”, by famously identifying the notion of a 
“measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction” (MEEQR) as “[a]ll trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-[Union] trade”.5  
But what was this “most famous pronouncement ever” supposed to mean?6 The conventional 
reading within European law scholarship has come to believe that the Court here offered a hyper-
liberal interpretation of the European internal market – an interpretation that radically dissociated 
itself from the conceptual shackles accepted in classic international trade law. According to this 
view, Dassonville represents the substantive law equivalent of Van Gend en Loos, which had – a 
decade earlier – formally cut the umbilical cord with the old legal order of international law.7  
The best-known popularization of this orthodox view has come from the pen of Joseph Weiler.8 
For the star philosopher of European law, the Dassonville Court was inspired by “a certain 
                                                     
*  Among the many people to thank, I am particularly grateful to Vilmos Budovari, Brigitte Leucht and Dieter Schlenker. 
The paper is warmly dedicated to Quentin Skinner, whose intellectual brilliance and personal modesty represent 
the best of academic and republican virtues. 
1  For a qualitative selection of “mythical” judgments, see: M. Poiares Maduro & L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future 
of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart, 2010); and from 
a quantitative “network” perspective, see: M. Derlén and J. Lindholm, Goodbye van Gend en Loos, Hello Bosman? 
Using Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual CJEU Judgments, (2014) 20 European Law 
Journal 667. 
2  For example: Professor Weiler’s “convergence thesis” with regard to international economic law and European 
internal market law (cf. J. H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade, in: J.H.H Weiler 
(ed.), The EU, The WTO and the NAFTA: Toward a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford University Press, 
2000), 201) is built on a particular reading of Dassonville; while Professor Maduro’s “We the Court: The European 
Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution” (Hart, 1998) is, in my view, a complex elaboration of 
the Court’s Keck judgment. 
3  M. Derlén and J. Lindholm, Goodbye van Gend en Loos, Hello Bosman? (supra n.1), 673. 
4  Ibid., 678. 
5  Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837, para.5. 
6  J. H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (supra n.2), 205. 
7  Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration, [1963] ECR 1. 
8  J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (supra n.2). This essay is an almost perfect 
replica of his earlier “The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the Free 
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Jacobean conception of the common market-place” – whatever that means – that “explicitly or 
implicitly reject[ed] the GATT philosophy of trying to find an uneasy balance between 
transnational free trade and broad choice of national social and economic options excised by states 
enjoying wide regulatory autonomy, which really has as its implicit ideal type a transnational 
market-place which is identical to a national market-place”.9 The view that Dassonville was 
intended to introduce a “national” market model can also be found in the standard textbooks on 
the internal market. In Catherine Barnard’s well-known manual, we read that Dassonville 
“provide[d] individual traders with a vehicle to challenge any national rule which – even 
potentially and indirectly – stands in their way”; and that such a revolutionary solution was 
justified because “[l]ooked at in its historical context, Dassonville was an effective tool to cull 
the dead wood of centuries of accumulated legislation”.10 And for the author of the first theoretical 
monograph on the law of the internal market, the meaning of the Dassonville judgment is equally 
clear:  
In its landmark Dassonville judgment of 1974, the ECJ made clear that also indistinctly 
applicable national measures were prohibited. The fact that it was sufficient for a measure to 
be “captured” by Article 34 for it to be “capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-[Union] trade”, could potentially subject all market regulations to a strict 
review under the free movement of goods, since they all have by their very nature an impact 
on trade. In other words, such [a] test did not require a national measure to be protectionist 
or to discriminate against foreign products to be subject to review under Article 34.11 
Hardly ever was there so much agreement among European law scholars; and it is therefore hardly 
surprising that political scientists, working on the internal market, have come to devotedly 
embrace the orthodox legal interpretation. In the most outstanding treatment of judicial politics 
in the context of Article 34, the conventional legal interpretation is thus devotedly accepted – 
despite running counter to its own internal logic;12 and in one of the most recent presentations of 
the standard political science narrative we read: 
[L]awyers know that the real radical breakthrough came in 1972 [sic] with Dassonville, in 
which the court had to decide once again what was meant by the Treaty of Rome’s summary 
statement, “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, 
without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States” (Article 
[34]). At the time, it boldly struck down a Belgian provision (requiring that imported goods 
bearing a designation of origin be accompanied by a certificate of origin) with a sweeping 
approach: “all measures with an equivalent effect to quotas” [sic] were to be struck down! This 
                                                     
Movement of Goods”, in: P. Craig & G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of European Law (Oxford University Press, 
1999), 349. 
9  J. H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (supra n.2), 215 (emphasis added). 
10  C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (OUP, 2016), 74 (emphasis added). 
11  M. Maduro, Revisiting the Free Movement of Goods in a Comparative Perspective, in: Court of Justice of the 
European Union, The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analysis and Perspectives on Sixty Years 
of Case Law (Asser, 2013), 485 at 489-490 (emphasis added). 
12  K. J. Alter & S. Meunier-Aitsahalia, Judicial Politics in the European Community: European Integration and the 
Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision, (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 535 at: 540: “Instead [!], legal 
scholars point to the landmark Dassonville (1974) ruling, which established a legal basis for challenging the validity 
of national laws that create nontariff barriers. To the extent that the Cassis decision ruled invalid a national law on 
the basis that it created a nontariff barrier, it was a straight application of the jurisprudence established in the 
Dassonville decision. In fact, rather than moving beyond the Dassonville decision, the legal innovation of the Cassis 
verdict, the rule of reason, actually softened the Court’s position regarding nontariff barriers. In extending the rights 
of the member states to maintain all reasonable national policies, which had the effect of creating nontariff barriers, 
the Court seemingly opened a huge loophole, albeit a loophole which could be controlled exclusively by the Court 
itself.” 
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was already and much more radical than Cassis in terms of result, an obligation of recognition. 
But it did not enunciate mutual recognition, and was in fact set aside as too bold. In this sense, 
Cassis was not a continuation but a break from Dassonville, which sought to impose an 
obstacles-based approach to national regulation, whereby all national rules are potentially 
subject to an assessment of illegality.13  
But is that really the meaning of Dassonville? Ought the “text” of the famous “formula” be taken 
at face value; or, must the judgment be understood in its historical context; and if so, what may 
the historical context tell us what the Court was hoping to “do”? Was the radical thought of 
dismantling all nontariff barriers that affected any external and internal trade judicially 
conceivable at the time of Dassonville; or is this historical foreshortening at its worst? Early on 
in my academic life, I was fairly certain that the “orthodox” truth was wrong; yet who would 
believe a not-yet-doctoral student without any significant academic credentials?14 And aware that 
much more historical and philosophical ammunition was needed to destruct as cherished a myth 
as Dassonville, nearly two decades have passed until my general study on the evolution of the 
internal market was published.15 But even this “generalist” study on the changing structure of 
internal market law proved too small for a special historical analysis of Dassonville and the 
evolution of its famous formula; and a second study dedicated to this topic will hopefully appear 
in the course of next year.16  
This EUI Working Paper wishes to offer an early glimpse of this second study. It aims to provide 
a – first – counter-interpretation to the orthodox reading of Dassonville in the legal and political 
science literature. This preliminary “re-reading” of Dassonville must necessarily omit much 
historical background; 17  and it also cannot completely set out its broader philosophical 
“framework” so as to explain how Dassonville became what it means today.18 For the purposes 
of the present study, I will therefore use a methodological “shortcut” and directly draw on the 
work of the intellectual historian Quentin Skinner.19 His “Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas” offers, in my view, one of the best keys to unlock the treasures of “classic” 
texts. 20  Section 1 will therefore briefly introduce Skinner’s three ways of “reading” before 
Sections 2-6 discuss the meaning of the Dassonville judgment itself. Section 2 here begins with 
                                                     
13  K. Nicolaïdis, The Cassis Legacy: Kir, Banks, Plumbers, Drugs, Criminals and Refugees, in F. Nicola & B. Davies, 
EU Law Stories (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 278 at 281 (emphasis added). Not only is the year of 
Dassonville wrong; the author quotes a passage that cannot be found in the Dassonville judgment. Alas, if political 
scientists – rightly – chastise lawyers for not reading enough non-legal materials, can we lawyers not equally 
complain if political scientists are unable to closely read (if they do read them at all) the fundamental judgments 
that they go on to write a great deal about?  
14  See my LLM Dissertation entitled “Untangling ‘Mixed Situations’: A Historical Analysis of the European Court’s 
Jurisprudence on the Free Movement of Goods from Consten & Grundig until Cassis de Dijon” (2000, unpublished 
manuscript). For similar conclusions, albeit ten years later and much less detailed, see: N. Bernard, On the Art of 
Not Mixing One’s Drinks: Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon Revisited, in: M. Poiares Maduro & L. Azoulai (eds.), 
The Past and Future of EU Law (supra n.1), 456.  
15  R. Schütze, From International to Federal Market: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
16  See “Framing Dassonville: Text and Context in European Law” (Cambridge University Press, in preparation). 
17  Ibid., Chapters 1 and 2. 
18  Ibid., Chapter 5 and Conclusion. 
19  Professor Skinner has become the most well-known representative of the “Cambridge School” of intellectual history. 
For an overview of the various strands within the history of ideas and “Begriffsgeschichte”, see only: E. Müller & 
F. Schmieder, Begriffsgeschichte und historische Semantik: Ein kritisches Kompendium (Surkamp, 2016). On a 
personal level, I am enormously grateful to Professor Skinner for allowing me, in 2007/08, to fully audit his famous 
“Hobbes Seminar” at the University of Cambridge. 
20  Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, (1969) 8 History and Theory 3. 
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a re-construction of the (inter)national legal environment, while Section 3 recreates the doctrinal 
context in which the Dassonville judgment must be placed. Section 4 analyses the normative 
arguments of the parties involved in the dispute in an attempt to understand how they themselves 
“understood” the case, while Section 5 presents the judicial “text” itself. Section 6 finally offers 
an “evolutionary” and “contextualized” re-reading of the judgment, while Section 7 compares 
this “new” interpretation with one – very important – subsequent judgment.21 A Conclusion 
returns to the question of what it all “means”. 
1. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” 
How are we to understand the “classics” – texts that have survived their contexts and eventually 
became “canonical” or even “foundational”?  
The reading – or “re-reading”22 – of such texts will traditionally follow one of two “classic” 
methodologies. A first methodology “insist on the autonomy of the text itself as the sole necessary 
key to its own meaning”; whereas a second methodology, by contrast, “insists that it is the context 
‘of religious, political, and economic factors’ which determines the meaning of any given text”.23 
These two ways of reading encounter a text from two fundamentally different philosophical 
perspectives: the textual methodology will tend to emphasize what is “permanent” (the text), 
whereas the contextual methodology will concentrate on the “transient” historical aspects (the 
context) in which the text was written. For Skinner, importantly, “neither approach seems a 
sufficient or even adequate means of achieving a proper understanding of any literary or 
philosophical work” because both methodologies “commit philosophical mistakes in the 
assumptions they make about the conditions necessary for the understanding of utterances”.24  
What are these mistakes; and what philosophical alternative did Skinner propose? Building on 
the work of Wittgenstein,25 the idea of an “innate” – permanent – meaning inherent in “the” text 
is fiercely discounted.26 The meaning of a word – as well as the meaning of a text – is its use; and 
since that use is constitutive, yet historically changing, there cannot be an “essentialist” meaning 
that remains identical throughout the ages. On the contrary, various “paradigms” of meanings 
must be distinguished; 27  and a simple textual or literal reading will therefore often be 
“contaminated by the unconscious application of paradigms whose familiarity to the historian 
disguises an essential inapplicability to the past”.28 The results of such historical foreshortenings 
are “historical absurdities” that “may in consequence be classified not as histories at all, but more 
                                                     
21  For a detailed study of the immediate reception period following Dassonville, see R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville 
(supra n.16), Chapter 4. 
22  The reader might recall Calvino’s witty definition of the classics as “those books about which you usually hear 
people saying: ‘I’m rereading…”, never “I’m reading….”. See: I. Calvino, Why Read the Classics? (Penguin 
Classics, 2009), 3. 
23  Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding (supra n.20), 3 (references omitted). 
24  Ibid., 4 (emphasis added). 
25  See particularly: L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell, 2001; originally published 1953). 
26  Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding (supra n.20), 37. 
27  Ibid., 6-7. Skinner here draws on the prior work of E.H. Gombricht “Art and Illusion” (London, 1960), but already 
recognizes the significance of the path-breaking work by T. Kuhn on “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” 
(Chicago, 1962). 
28  Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding (supra n.20), 7. 
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appropriately as mythologies”.29  To simply concentrate on the classic texts – as text – will 
therefore lead to “writing historical non-sense”.30 
For Skinner, as for many others, 31  there exists thus a fundamental hermeneutic distinction 
between “the retrospective significance of a given historical work or action” and its “meaning for 
the agent himself”.32 And while we cannot look inside the agent or author’s head to discover his 
or her subjective motives, the historian must aim to reconstruct the contemporary paradigm in 
which the actor said what s/he said so as to exclude interpretations that are “dependent on the use 
of criteria of description or classification not available to the agent himself”.33  
But, then, what is wrong with the “contextual” methodology in interpreting classic texts? While 
much closer to the historian’s heart, Skinner’s criticism with regard to this second traditional way 
of reading is targeted at discrediting social determinism: the study of the social context may “help 
in the understanding of a text” but it is a fundamental mistake to claim that “the ideas of a given 
text should be understood in terms of its social context”.34 A classic text may rebel against its own 
historical background through omissions or innovations;35  and to understand these semantic 
“moves”, one must try to re-construct what the author of a text tried to “do” with it. Drawing on 
Austin’s theory of “speech acts”,36 Skinner here argues that “meaning” and “understanding” are 
not, strictly speaking, correlative terms;37 and that a complete understanding of a text is only 
possible if we can reconstruct its invisible “illocutionary force”.38 That force is the “intention” 
with which the text was written; and in order to distil that intention we need to know the specific 
question that an author wished to answer.39  
To quote this complex train of thought at some length:  
The essential question which we therefore confront, in studying any given text, is what its 
author, in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in 
practice have been intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance. It follows 
that the essential aim, in any attempt to understand the utterances themselves, must be to 
recover this complex intention on the part of the author … The problem about the way in which 
these facts are handled in the methodology of contextual study is that they get fitted into an 
                                                     
29  Ibid. Skinner discusses in great detail the various “mythologies” that are engendered by a textual or essentialist 
reading (ibid., 7 et seq.). 
30  Ibid., 31. 
31  This is – almost – universally accepted, see: E. Müller & F. Schmieder, Begriffsgeschichte und historische Semantik 
(supra n.19). 
32  Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding (supra n.20), 22. 
33  Ibid., 29. 
34  Ibid., 43 (emphasis in original). 
35  With regard to omissions, Skinner mentions the example of Locke’s “Second Treatise” in which Locke fails to use 
historical arguments – despite their being a prevalent argumentative topos at the time; and claims that this omission 
“constituted perhaps the most radical and original feature of his whole argument” (ibid., 47). 
36  J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Harvard University Press, 1975). The book was originally published in 
1962. 
37   Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding (supra n.20), 45. The distinction maps onto Max Weber’s famous 
distinction between “erklären” and “verstehen”. 
38  Ibid., 46. 
39  Skinner here draws on R.G. Collingwood in whose “An Autobiography”, we read: “[T]he history of political theory 
is not the history of different answers given to one and the same question, but the history of a problem more or less 
constantly changing, whose solution was changing with it.” See R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Clarendon 
Press, 1978), 62. 
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inappropriate framework. The ‘context’ mistakenly gets treated as the determinant of what is 
said. It needs rather to be treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what 
conventionally recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been 
possible for someone to have intended to communicate.40 
With both the textual and the traditional contextual methodologies discarded, 41  what is the 
alternative methodology that Skinner proposes? For him, the way to reconstruct the “meaning” 
and (contemporary) “understanding” of a classic text will first of all require a survey of “the whole 
range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given 
occasion”, and, secondly, “to trace the relations between the given utterances and this wider 
linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer”.42 The context 
to a text here acts “as a sort of court of appeal for assessing the relative plausibility” of statements; 
yet, importantly, it still leaves the author free to “do” something different with the normative 
vocabulary that is at her disposal. And to quote Skinner once more: 
What exactly does this approach enable us to grasp about the classical tests that we cannot 
grasp simply by reading them? The answer, in general terms, is I think that it enables us to 
characterize what their authors were doing in writing them. We can begin to see not merely 
what arguments they were presenting, but also what questions they were addressing and trying 
to answer, and how far they were accepting and endorsing, or questioning and repudiating, or 
perhaps even polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and conventions of political 
debate. We cannot expect this level of understanding if we only study the texts themselves. In 
order to see them as answers to specific questions, we need to know something about the 
society in which they were written. And in order to recognize the exact direction and force of 
their arguments, we need to have some appreciation of the general political vocabulary of the 
age.43 
What will this agent-centric contextual methodology offer to a re-reading of classic judgments?  
Legal judgments are by definition words in action. A court will always “do” something when 
writing a judgment; and it will have always (a) specific question(s) to answer. And yet, these 
specific answers will travel through time, especially in legal orders based on “precedents”, that 
is: “sentences” that are meant not only to “decide” a concrete case in the present but to also offer 
“binding” meaning for the future. 
The legal historian must therefore try to strictly separate what a classic case originally meant and 
what it has come to mean. But more fundamentally, in order to discover the original meaning and 
understanding of a classic judgment, the legal historian cannot simply engage in the historical 
reconstruction of its broader social or political context; s/he must, additionally try to discover the 
strategic “moves” that a court, as an agent, was making. These moves are partly determined by 
the “facts” and the “arguments” of the parties to the dispute; yet much more importantly, a court 
                                                     
40  Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding (supra n.20), 48-49. 
41  Ibid., 47: “It must follow that in order to be said to have understood any statement made in the past, it cannot be 
enough to grasp what was said, or even to grasp that the meaning of what was said may have changed. It cannot in 
consequence be enough to study either what the statement meant, or even what its context may be alleged to show 
about what it must have meant. The further point which must still be grasped for any given statement is how what 
was said was meant, and thus what relations there may have been between various different statements even within 
the same general context.” 
42  Ibid., 49. 
43  Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1979), xiii 
(emphasis added). Skinner here acknowledges a parallel to the (French) mentalitiés historical school, which formed 
part of the Annales School whose leader was of course none other than Fernand Braudel. 
 
“Re-reading” Dassonville 
European University Institute 7 
will always be in a conversation with its own – judicial – past; and it is this “doctrinal” context – 
pace legal realists – that generally and predominantly determines the outcome of a given case. In 
order to fully “understand” a classic case, we therefore need to explore the broader social and 
legal context as well as the specific doctrinal context in which the court “moves”; and in order to 
better illustrate this methodology let us apply it to one of the most famous cases of European 
Union law: Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville. 
What was the original meaning of Dassonville when decided in 1974; and how did its author – 
the European Court of Justice – intend it to be understood? While this is – in the absence of crucial 
documents on the authors’ original intention44 – a hard interpretative enterprise, we shall in the 
following three sections try to historically reconstruct the legal and doctrinal stage on which 
Dassonville was played out (Sections 2 and 3). Of particular interest here will, of course, be the 
legal arguments and conceptual vocabulary of the historical protagonists involved (Section 4) – 
which will tell us something about how they themselves understood the case.  
2. Legal Environment I: The (Inter)National Legal Context  
Eighty-four bottles of whisky had shipped from Scotland to France. Imported in 1970, a year in 
which the United Kingdom was still a country outside the Union,45 the British imports had entered 
the “common market” on the basis of the French customs rules. 46  They were subsequently 
delivered to the two exclusive distributors of “Johnnie Walker” and “VAT 69” in France from 
whom a certain Gustave Dassonville had bought them. This proud owner of a wholesales business 
in wines and spirits in Halluin – a small French border town next to Belgium – swiftly exported 
the bottles to Belgium where he knew the sales prices of these whisky brands to be significantly 
higher.  
                                                     
44  While the European Commission archives have been open for some time, the judicial “dossiers” were, until very 
recently, not publically available. The Court has however now opened the gates to its past, yet the “délibéré” in 
which the judges discuss and compose a draft judgment is still not publically accessible. The relevant pages in the 
judicial “dossier” are extracted. 
45  It may be remembered that the Accession Treaty between the Member States of the European Communities and the 
United Kingdom (as well as the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the Kingdom of Norway) was signed on 22 
January 1972 with the Treaty entering into force on 1 January 1973. The facts of Dassonville thus occurred, when 
the United Kingdom was still a third country outside the European Union. And importantly, as regards the judgment 
in Dassonville in 1974, the prohibition on measures having equivalent effect in Article 34 TFEU did not have direct 
effect in the United Kingdom until 1 January 1975 – that is: after the Court delivered Dassonville. For Article 42 
of the Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustment to the Treaties expressly stated (emphasis 
added): “Quantitative restrictions on imports and exports shall, from the date of accession, be abolished between 
the [Union] as originally constituted and the new Member States and between the new Member States themselves. 
Measures having equivalent effect to such restrictions shall be abolished by 1 January 1975 at the latest.” 
46  The European Economic Community was conceived as a customs union in which third country goods could travel 
freely once “the import formalities have been complied with and any customs duties or charges having equivalent 
effects which are payable have been levied” in the Member State of first import. See Articles 28-29 TFEU; and for 
a fuller discussion, see: R. Schütze, From International to Federal Market (supra n.15), 187 et seq. 
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In December 1970, just in time for the pre-Christmas sales, the eighty-four bottles were put up 
for sales in Brussels, where Benôit Dassonville – Gustave’s son – managed a branch of his father’s 
business. To underline the “Scottish” origin of their bottles, the Dassonvilles decided to affix 
labels bearing the printed words “British Customs Certificate of Origin” – even though they were 
not in possession of such certificates. Following an on-the-spot inspection of their Brussels shop, 
they were charged with forgery because according to Belgian law, all foreign designations of 
origin – like “Scotch” Whisky – were legally required to be accompanied by an official certificate 
of origin issued by the country of origin.  
The ensuing criminal case, brought by a Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Belgian King, was 
joined by two civil parties: Fourcroy and Breuval – the two exclusive distributors of “Johnny 
Walker” and “VAT 69” in Belgium. These two Belgian dealers were part of a network of 
exclusive distribution agreements concluded by “The Distillers Company” the legality of which 
the Commission had investigated for some time.47  The two competitors of the Dassonvilles 
claimed that the parallel importation of “their” brands into Belgium had caused them economic 
losses in “their” national territory; and it indeed seemed likely that it had been these two 
competitors that had denounced the Dassonvilles to the Belgian authorities in the first place.  
The resulting national criminal case against the Dassonvilles raised a number of important 
questions that can only be understood if we first reconstruct the legal context in which the above 
facts occurred.  
                                                     
47  On 30 June 1963, the Distillers Company Limited, a consortium of 38 subsidiaries that covered the labels of “Johnny 
Walker” and “VAT 69”, had applied to the Commission under Regulation 17 for an exemption under Article 101 
(3) TFEU. During the travails of Dassonville, the Commission had however not yet been taken a decision. A – 
negative – decision was in fact only taken in 1978, [1978] OJ L50/16. For a contemporary academic analysis of the 
Commission decision, see: V. Korah, Goodbye Red Label: Condemnation of Dual Pricing by Distillers, (1978) 3 
European Law Review 62. 
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a. Legal Background: The Protection of Foreign “Designations of Origin” 
Following the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,48 a set of bilateral 
treaties had been concluded between “Belgium” and France as well as “Belgium” and Portugal 
in the 1920s. 49  These bilateral treaties committed the High Contracting Parties to take the 
necessary legislative and administrative measures to outlaw the use of false designations of origin; 
and in order to fulfil its international obligations, the Belgian State had adopted a “Law on the 
Protection of Designations of Origin for Wines and Spirits” in 1927. In light of its international 
origin, the aim of the law was to protect all foreign wines and spirits bearing a designation of 
origin.50 The scope of the law nonetheless went beyond the mere implementation of the two 
bilateral treaties, mentioned above, since it also allowed other States to have their designations of 
origin protected once they were officially recognized by the Belgian government.51  
The core provision within the 1927 Belgian law thereby stated:  
The abusive attribution of a designation of origin for wines or spirits in connection with their 
importation, storage, exportation, production, circulation, sale or put up for sale constitutes an 
illegal use of that designation of origin. The addition of such corrective terms such as “kind”, 
“type” or “manner” will not remove the abusive character of such an illegal use of a designation 
of origin. 
The following persons are, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed to abuse a 
designation of origin: 
                                                     
48  The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property covers “appellations of origin” under its wider 
definition of industrial property, see: ibid., Article 1(3): “Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest 
sense and shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and extractive 
industries and to all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, 
mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.” And importantly, Article 10 of the 1883 Convention expressly assimilated 
the “direct or indirect use of a false indication of the source of the goods” to a violation of a trademark right. For 
the express view that “appellations” or “designations” of origin constitute intellectual property, see: H. Matthies, 
Herkunftsangaben und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, in G. Lüke (ed.), Festschrift für Gerhard Schiedermair 
(Beck, 1976) 391 at 398: “Nach allgemeiner Ansicht fallen Herkunftsangaben und Ursprungsbezeichnungen unter 
den Begriff des “gewerblichen und kommerziellen Eigentums” im Sinne [des Artikels 36].”  
49  Treaty between the Belgian-Luxembourg Union and France (4 April 1925); and Treaty between the Belgian-
Luxembourg Union and Portugal (6 January 1927). Technically, these two treaties were not concluded by 
“Belgium” but by the Union of States of which Belgium formed part. 
50  The text of the law can be found here: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=346. Article 1 states: “En ce 
qui concerne les vins et les eaux-de-vie, sont considérées comme appellations d’origine celles qui auront été 
notifiées au gouvernement belge par les gouvernements intéressés, comme étant des appellations d’origine 
officiellement et définitivement adoptées. Toute appellation d’origine adoptée devra avoir été signalée par la voie 
du Moniteur belge.”  
51  The United Kingdom government had “signalled”, on 5 August 1949, the Belgian government its wish to protect the 
designation of origin “Scotch Whisky”, and, the “Moniteur Belge” immediately published the following note: 
“L’Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique à Bruxelles a notifié la protection de l’application d’origine “Scotch 
Whisky” conformément aux disposition de la section 24 to “British Finance Act” de 1933.” The British Act here 
stated in Section 24: “For the purpose of subsection (9) of section one hundred and five of the Spirits Act, 1880 
(which relates to the accuracy of the description of spirits in a permit or certificate), spirits described as Scotch 
whisky shall not be deemed to correspond to that description unless they have been obtained by distillation in 
Scotland from a mash of cereal grains saccharified by the diastase of malt and have been matured in a bonded 
warehouse in casks for a period of at least three years.” This 1933 Act had subsequently been amended by the 1969 
Finance Act, Schedule 7, which stated: “Miscellaneous provisions as to Customs and Excise: Definition of 
Whisky… (b) the expression of “Scotch Whisky” shall mean whisky which has been distilled in Scotland.” 
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1. The owners, producers or traders who offer or sell under a designation of origin wines 
or alcoholic spirits at prices manifestly below the prices generally adopted for wines 
or spirits of that designation; 
2. Those whose name or address misleadingly recalls a designation of origin so as to 
cause confusion, unless the seller expressly and specifically indicates his name and 
address in addition to the real origin of the wines or spirits. 
The abusive use of a designation of origin shall entitle any natural or legal person to bring civil 
proceedings to prevent the illegal use of the designation of origin when the latter leads to a 
direct or indirect damage to that person.52  
The legal protection of designations of origin had here originally been left to the civil courts and 
the private enforcement by affected competitors; yet in the middle of the Great Depression during 
the 1930s, the Belgian legislator suddenly empowered the Belgian King “in the hope of economic 
and financial recovery” to enhance the protection of industrial and commercial property rights;53 
and, as the 1927 Law on Foreign Designations of Origin was seen as “insufficient”,54 a 1934 
Royal Decree henceforth prohibited the illegal use of such designations under criminal law 
sanctions. The new regime had been adopted especially in light of Belgium’s international 
obligations vis-à-vis France, and its central provisions stated: 
Article 1 
It is prohibited to import, sell, put up for sale, store or transport alcoholic spirits bearing a 
designation of origin officially recognized by the Belgian government if these spirits are not 
accompanied by an official document proving their right to bearing that designation.  
Article 2 
It is prohibited to employ on containers, labels, packaging, caps and other closure devices, as 
well as invoices, waybills or other documents used in commerce as well as prospectus, 
catalogues, price lists, maps, posters, signs, billboards and any indications or signs that:  
1. Deceive about the manufacturing process, the nature or the origin of the spirits;  
2. Assign a designation of origin to spirits that has not been officially recognized by the Belgian 
government. 
It is moreover expressly forbidden to use characters for the name and address of the 
manufacturer or seller that are higher than 2mm when these names or addresses evoke a 
designation of origin to which the product is not entitled to.  
A breach of either provision could – according to Article 4 of the Royal Decree – be punished by 
a term of imprisonment of up to two months and a fine; and it was a breach of these rules that the 
Dassonvilles had been charged with. The formal reason for their violation of the Belgian Royal 
Decree was thereby the lack of an official document attesting to their being entitled to import and 
sell “Scotch Whisky” in Belgium.  
                                                     
52  1927 Belgian Law on the Protection of Designations of Origin for Wines and Spirits, Article 2 (my translation). 
53  Belgian Royal Decree No. 57 of 20 December 1934, Preamble 1 (my translation). 
54  One of the reasons behind this desire to strengthen the protection of foreign designations of origin may have been 
the 1934 London Act revising the 1891 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods, see: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/madrid/. 
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b. Legal Foreground: Administrative and Judicial Developments 
But there is more. Just after the Dassonvilles had imported their bottles into Belgium, the relevant 
Belgian customs rules had been strengthened. Two customs circulars in particular now interpreted 
the 1927 and 1934 acts in such a way as to give them an even stricter content. According to the 
first circular, the “importation” of wines and spirits would, in the future, be subject to a special 
regulatory regime: 
A document henceforth called “entry document” (titre d’introduction) must be produced for 
these products when they are imported for consumption or transit; and this document must be 
presented at the same time as the customs declaration for these goods. The entry document can 
be a certificate of designation, a certificate of origin etc., but in each of these cases it must be 
issued by either the government or a functional organ under the control of the government of 
the State or origin … Customs officials thereby must not accept entry documents other than 
originals. They will refuse all copies, even certified ones, all photocopies or other forms of 
reproduction.55 
This first customs circular was joined by a second one in 1972, adopted on behalf of the public 
health ministry, and just before the British entry into the European common market.56 It stated:  
Resulting from a Communication issued by the Public Health Ministry, the customs 
administration must ensure that the name and address of the Belgian recipient is indicated on 
all documents required for customs clearance. The recipient of the designated goods or his 
agent must moreover make this declaration, unless the recipient has authorised a client to 
present these documents to the customs administration. Furthermore, as regards all spirits 
under the designation of origin “Scotch Whisky”, the same Ministry has decided that the 
document “Customs and Excise Certificate for Spirits Exported to Belgium – C & E 94 A”, as 
issued by the British customs authorities, constitutes the official entry document that must 
accompany the goods.57 
These Belgian norms were clearly distinctly applicable to imports; and by asking for a special 
“entry document”, they seemed – at least as regards intra-Union trade – in clear tension with the 
idea of a customs union in which the free circulation of goods was to be ensured.58 For the British 
Customs Certificate – which can be found below – was specific to imports into Belgium and 
expressly excluded products in free circulation in another Member State. It was this document 
that the Dassonvilles did not possess when they – fatefully – decided to affix labels on their bottles 
bearing the printed words “British Customs Certificate of Origin”.  
 
 
                                                     
55  (Belgian) Custom Legislation 3/13.800, Articles 3, 4 and 7 (my translation, emphasis added). The various Belgian 
customs circulars can be found in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de Procédure Original 1: Affaire 
8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 174 et seq.  
56  (Belgian) Customs Legislation 3/17.388, which can be found in ibid., 199.  
57  Ibid (emphasis added). 
58  The exact legal regime established by European Union law at the time was however not so clear. For the customs 
legislation existing at the time, see: R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville (supra n.16), Chapter 2.  
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Once the forgery had been discovered, a public prosecutor charged the Dassonvilles with a 
violation of Article 1 of the 1934 Royal Decree before the Brussels First Instance Court. Its 
Eighteenth Chamber met on 11 January 1974; and a single judge – a certain Madam Schmidt – 
considered that in light of the common market questions raised, “a decision on the[se] question[s] 
[was] necessary to enable [her] to give judgment”.59 She suspended the criminal proceedings 
before the national court and referred two preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice. 
The two questions were:  
1. Must Articles [34 and 36] be interpreted as meaning that a national provision prohibiting, in 
particular, the import of goods such as spirits bearing a designation of origin duly adopted by 
a national government where such goods are not accompanied by an official document issued 
by the government of the exporting country certifying their right to such designation, must be 
considered as a quantitative restriction or as a measure having equivalent effect? 
2. Is an agreement to be considered void if its effect is to restrict competition and adversely to 
affect trade between Member States only when taken in conjunction with national rules with 
regard to certificates of origin when that agreement merely authorizes or does not prohibit the 
exclusive importer from exploiting that rule for the purpose of preventing parallel imports?60 
These two questions must themselves be understood against the European doctrinal context 
existing at the time. 
3. Legal Environment II: The European Doctrinal Context  
One of the most pressing concerns within the early common market was the problem of parallel 
imports. Parallel imports are imports that run “in parallel” to the official trade channels – set up 
by the Member States or by private traders.  
Private traders may wish to channel the distribution of their goods for a number of commercial 
reasons the most important of which is the exploitation of price differentials between national 
markets. The price of consumer goods – be they television sets or whisky bottles – can 
significantly differ depending on whether they are purchased in Britain, France or Germany; and 
in order to have consumers pay the highest price possible, private parties might wish to limit the 
importation or exportation of their goods via a number of commercial mechanisms. The perhaps 
most important contractual tool here are exclusive distribution agreements,61 while the most 
important public tool are intellectual property rights. Going beyond the relative (territorial) 
protection offered by contract, such property rights promise to offer absolute (territorial) 
protection against third parties wishing to import or market a product without the consent of the 
producer. All parallel trade can here be blocked because national intellectual property laws offer 
a private “sales ban” within the national territory.62 
How would the European Union deal with such private “sales bans”? While undoubtedly 
restricting the importation and sale of a foreign good, these restrictions are the result of private 
parties (ab)using national laws. Would the Court examine them, as private party actions, under 
the competition rules of the Rome Treaty; or would it examine them, as State actions, under the 
                                                     
59  One of the great innovations of the Rome Treaty had been a judicial reference procedure that would allow national 
courts to ask “preliminary” questions to the European Court of Justice under (what is today) Article 267 TFEU. 
60  Dassonville – Facts, 841.  
61  For a discussion of this point, see: R. Schütze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018), Chapter 
17 – Section 2 (d). 
62  For an early analysis here, see: W. Alexander, Industrial Property Rights and the Establishment of the European 
Common Market, (1972) 9 Common Market Law Review 35. 
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internal market provisions? How indeed would the Court deal with such “mixed situations”? 
Would it disentangle them and separately look at the competition law aspect as well as the internal 
market aspect; or would it combine both dimensions into a single judicial analysis?  
The answer to this question has changed over time. For blocked from directly using Article 34 
during the transitional period,63 the Court employed, in a first step, the – directly effective – 
provisions of European competition law, and especially Article 101, to the fullest; and only once 
Article 34 had itself become directly effective, did the Court transfer some of the doctrinal 
principles established under Article 101 to Article 34. 
a. Constructing the Common Market during the Transitional Period  
With Article 34 lacking direct effect, how could the Court review national laws that hindered 
international trade in goods? The Court’s answer during the transitional period of European law 
is a complex one – and one that builds on the competition law provisions of the Rome Treaty. For 
having found these provisions to have direct effect very early on,64 it was through the medium of 
these provisions that the European Court could indirectly review national legislation that it 
perceived to hinder the establishment of the common market.  
The primary target for the Court during this first period was national intellectual property laws; 
and the most famous case here undoubtedly is Consten & Grundig.65 Grundig had appointed 
Consten as its exclusive distributor in France. The German manufacturer had contractually agreed 
not to deliver its televisions sets to other traders on the French market, while it had also consented 
to contractually prohibit its German wholesalers from exporting goods into France. This (relative) 
territorial protection was to allow Consten to exploit the higher price level on the French market, 
and in order to further prevent parallel traders from selling its products into France, Grundig had 
also agreed to transfer its international trademark (GINT) to Consten. This intellectual property 
right prohibited anyone else to market Grundig products on the French market and thus granted 
absolute territorial protection to Consten.  
How would the Court deal with such a selective “sales ban”? Was the national trademark law not 
operating like a MEEQR in that it hindered imports into France – almost as much as a (public) 
import licence would? Due to the lack of direct effect of Article 34 during the transitional period, 
the Court could not analyse the national law under this provision; and it therefore, somewhat 
creatively, attributed the trade restrictive effect caused by the French trademark law to the private 
agreement conferring the trademark.66 This doctrinal “move” would allow the Court to apply 
                                                     
63  The Court denied the direct effect of Articles 34 TFEU during the transitional period in Case 20/64, Albatros v 
Société des pétroles et des combustibles liquides (Sopéco), [1965] ECR 29 at 35: “The Treaty thus does not imply 
the immediate abrogation of all the measures for controlling imports existing when it entered into force, but does 
on the other hand involve the prohibition of any new restriction or discrimination, the obligation progressively to 
abolish existing restrictions and discriminations the necessity that they should disappear totally at the latest by the 
end of the transitional period.” 
64  The direct effect of the core competition provisions, and especially Article 101 (1), was confirmed in Case 13/61, 
Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de 
zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn, [1962] ECR 45. 
65  Joined Cases 56 and 58-64, Établissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission, [1966] ECR 299. 
For a specific discussion of the trademark aspects of the case, see: H.W. Wertheimer, National Trademark Law 
and the Common Market Rules of Competition: A Case Study of the Trademark Implications in the Consten-
Grundig Case, (1967) 4 Common Market Law Review 399. 
66  Consten & Grundig (supra n.65), 345: “The applicants maintain more particularly that the criticized effect on 
competition is due not to the agreement but to the registration of the trade-mark in accordance with French law, 
which gives rise to an original inherent right of the holder of the trade-mark from which the absolute territorial 
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Article 34 analogously via the medium of Union competition law. This ingenious solution was 
subsequently confirmed in Sirena,67 where the Court offered an extensive clarification of the 
relationship between the free movement of goods provisions and the competition rules:  
Article [101] and subsequent articles of the Treaty do not deal expressly with the relationships 
between the [Union] system of competition and national laws concerning industrial and 
commercial property rights and, more particularly, trade-marks… In the sphere of provisions 
relating to the free movement of products, prohibitions and restrictions on imports justified on 
the grounds of protection of industrial and commercial property are allowed by Article 36, 
subject to the express condition that they 'shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States'. Article 36, although 
it appears in the Chapter of the Treaty dealing with quantitative restrictions on trade between 
Member States, is based on a principle equally applicable to the question of competition, in 
the sense that even if the rights recognized by the legislation of a Member State on the subject 
of industrial and commercial property are not affected, so far as their existence is concerned, 
by Articles [101 and 102] of the Treaty, their exercise may still fall under the prohibitions 
imposed by those provisions.68 
In light of Article 101’s inability to review any state measures as such, the Court here established 
the idea that while it could not restrict the “existence” of intellectual property rights, it could 
nevertheless limit their “exercise”. Article 101 could consequently apply where “the combination 
of assignments to different users of national trade-marks protecting the same product has the 
result of re-enacting impenetrable frontiers between the Member States”.69 For the Court, Article 
101 therefore not only exercised a market regulation function, it also had a market building 
function; and the latter was naturally interpreted in light of the free movement provisions of the 
Rome Treaty. 
That this analogous use of Article 34 via the medium of the competition rules could be applied 
beyond intellectual property laws was subsequently confirmed in Béguelin.70 The case involved 
a Japanese producer of cigarette lighters that had concluded an exclusive distribution agreement 
with Béguelin for the “French market” and with Marbach for the “German market”. The second 
exclusive distributor had nonetheless imported goods into France and Béguelin therefore brought 
an action before a French commercial court for unlawful and unfair competition. Could the 
(French) law on unfair competition here be used to transform the relative territorial protection 
granted by an exclusive distribution agreement into an absolute legal shield? To quote the Court 
a little more extensively:  
To be incompatible with the common market and prohibited under Article [101], an agreement 
must be one which ‘may affect trade between Member States’ and have ‘as [its] object or effect’ 
                                                     
protection derives under national law. Consten’s right under the contract to the exclusive user in France of the 
GINT trade mark, which may be used in a similar manner in other countries, is intended to make it possible to keep 
under surveillance and to place an obstacle in the way of parallel imports. Thus, the agreement by which Grundig, 
as the holder of the trade-mark by virtue of an international registration, authorized Consten to register it in France 
in its own name tends to restrict competition. Although Consten is, by virtue of the registration of the GINT trade-
mark, regarded under French law as the original holder of the rights relating to that trade-mark, the fact nevertheless 
remains that it was by virtue of an agreement with Grundig that it was able to effect the registration. That agreement 
therefore is one which may be caught by the prohibition in Article [101] (1). The prohibition would be ineffective 
if Consten could continue to use the trade-mark to achieve the same object as that pursued by the agreement which 
has been held to be unlawful.” 
67  Case 40/70, Sirena Srl v Eda Srl and others, [1971] ECR 69. 
68  Ibid., paras.4-5 (emphasis added). 
69  Ibid., para.10 (emphasis added). 
70  Case 22/71, Béguelin Import Co. v S.A.G.L. Import Export, [1971] ECR 949. 
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an impediment to ‘competition within the common market’ … An exclusive dealing agreement 
entered into between a producer who is subject to the law of a third country and a distributor 
established in the common market fulfils the two aforementioned conditions when, de jure or 
de facto, it prevents the distributor from re-exporting the products in question to other Member 
States or prevents the products from being imported from other Member States into the 
protected area and from being distributed therein by persons other then the exclusive dealer or 
his customers … More especially, an exclusive dealing agreement is liable to affect trade 
between Member States and may have the effect of impeding competition if, owing to the 
combined effects of the agreement and of national legislation on unfair competition, the dealer 
is able to prevent parallel imports from other Member States into territory covered by the 
agreement. The dealer may, therefore, rely on such legislation only if the alleged unfairness of 
his competitors' behaviour arises from factors other than their having effected parallel 
imports.71 
The combined effect of a private distribution agreement and a national law could thus lead to a 
violation of Article 101, where a private party would use the national law so as to establish de 
jure or de facto absolute territorial protection for its national market. The “use” of a national law 
that re-created hard national borders could thus potentially fall foul of the competition law 
provisions of the Rome Treaty.  
b. Constructing the Common Market after the Transitional Period  
With the direct effect of Article 34 potentially starting in 1970, the Court shifted its attention to 
that provision when it came to national hindrances to international trade. With regard to 
intellectual property rights, this development started in Deutsche Grammophon.72 The plaintiff 
here expressly objected to the use of the competition law prism to evaluate a national copyright 
law on the ground that “it [w]as [the] national law itself which create[d] barriers”;73 and the 
Court accepted the argument. It consequently examined whether the national law itself was 
“compatible with other provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to the free movement 
of goods”.74 This direct use of Article 34 with regard to national intellectual property rights was 
definitely confirmed in Hag – a case decided a week before Dassonville.75 The message of the 
                                                     
71  Ibid., paras.10, 12 and 14-15. Consider also the view of Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe (ibid., 970): “In 
my view, the principles established on the subject of trademarks and intellectual property are equally valid in the 
more general field of the protection of a trader against acts amounting to unfair competition. Is not the essential 
aim of national legislation on trademarks or intellectual property to provide special protection against a certain 
form of competition judged to be unfair?” 
72  Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, [1971] ECR 478. 
73  Ibid., 492 (emphasis added). 
74  Ibid., para.7. And when analysing Article 36, the Court here held (ibid., paras.12-13 (emphasis added)): “If a right 
related to copyright is relied upon to prevent the marketing in a Member State of products distributed by the holder 
of the right or with his consent on the territory of another Member State on the sole ground that such distribution 
did not take place on the national territory, such a prohibition, which would legitimize the isolation of national 
markets, would be repugnant to the essential purpose of the Treaty, which is to unite national markets into a single 
market. That purpose could not be attained if, under the various legal systems of the Member States, nationals of 
those States were able to partition the market and bring about arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on 
trade between Member States. Consequently, it would be in conflict with the provisions prescribing the free 
movement of products within the common market for a manufacturer of sound recordings to exercise the exclusive 
right to distribute the protected articles, conferred upon him by the legislation of a Member State, in such a way as 
to prohibit the sale in that State of products placed on the market by him or with his consent in another Member 
State solely because such distribution did not occur within the territory of the first Member State.” 
75  Case 192-73, Van Zuylen frères v Hag, [1974] ECR 731. The judgment was delivered by the Full Court and the 
Reporting Judge in Hag was Judge Mackenzie Stuart, who will also be the Reporting Judge in Dassonville. 
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Court was here clear: legal situations that affected both the competition law rules and the free 
movement rules could henceforth be analysed – independently – under both parts of the Treaty.  
What, however, were the doctrinal principles governing Article 34 after the transitional period? 
To assist the Court in its interpretation of the provision after 1969, the Commission had adopted 
a Directive that offered its position on the meaning of the concept of MEEQR.76 Drawing a 
categorical distinction between distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures, Directive 70/50 
was based on the idea that – in principle – only the former category would violate Article 34.77 
Directive 70/50 indeed confirmed the GATT principle that non-discriminatory “internal measures” 
were excluded from the scope of Article 34 and that obstacles “inherent in the disparities between 
rules applied by Member States” would not be caught be the provision.78  
What was the Court to make of these interpretative guidelines? A first case that directly dealt with 
Article 34 was International Fruit.79 In this preliminary ruling, the question had arisen whether 
Article 34 would apply to Dutch rules formally prohibiting the importation of goods without an 
import licence – despite the fact that the national rules were actually “not applied because 
exemptions [were] granted from the prohibition and, where this [was] not so, because the licence 
[was] always issued on request”.80 The Dutch system of import licences thus only existed “in the 
books”; and the Dutch Government consequently argued that the national measure constituted a 
purely potential obstacle to trade that was not prohibited because Article 34 only applied when 
the “actual application of measures” created actual obstacles to trade.  
To this the Commission had responded as follows:  
[T]he expression 'quantitative restrictions' refers to all national measures directly excluding, 
totally or partially, the import or export of a product on the basis of numbers or quantities. With 
regard to the concept of 'measures having equivalent effect', these are measures the prohibition 
of which appears, within the system of the Treaty, as a necessary complement to the prohibition 
of quantitative restrictions … However, whilst with regard to quantitative restrictions such an 
effect is direct, in the case of measures having equivalent effect it is indirect and arises from 
the fact that imports or exports are rendered more difficult or costly in comparison with the 
marketing of the domestic product. The difficulties created for imports or exports may be 
absolute or relative but it is in any event the potential effect of the measure in question which 
must be taken into consideration.81 
The Commission here essentially defined the concept of MEEQR as any measure that constituted 
a “direct” or “indirect”, “actual” or “potential” hindrance to imports; yet it also suggested that this 
wide definition should be confined to intra-Union trade and would therefore not extend to trade 
with third countries.82  
The Court partly followed these suggestions and held: 
                                                     
76  Directive 70/50 on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports 
and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty, [1970] OJ L13/29. 
77  Ibid., Article 2. The Directive acknowledged however an exception to this rule in its Article 3. The provision captured 
“measures governing the marketing of products” “where the restrictive effect of such measures on the free 
movement of goods exceeds the effects intrinsic to trade rules”. 
78  Ibid., preamble 8 (emphasis added). 
79  Case 51-54/71, International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor groenten en fruit, [1971] ECR 
1107. 
80  International Fruit – Judgement, para.5. 
81  International Fruit – Facts, 1113 (emphasis added). 
82  Ibid., 1114. 
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Under Articles [34 and 35] of the Treaty quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect are prohibited between Member States both with regard to imports and 
exports. Consequently, apart from the exceptions for which provision is made by [Union] law 
itself those provisions preclude the application to intra-[Union] trade of a national provision 
which requires, even purely as a formality, import or export licences or any other similar 
procedure. On the other hand in trade with third countries the application of quantitative 
restrictions and of measures having equivalent effect forms part of the common commercial 
policy under Article [207] of the Treaty and the provisions on the common agricultural policy, 
in particular Article 40[2], which provides for the establishment of ‘common machinery for 
stabilizing imports or exports’.83 
This interpretation was important in two ways. First, the Court clarified that the scope of 
application of Article 34 depended on whether trade with Member States or trade with non-
Member States was involved; and secondly, it held, with regard to intra-Union trade, that import 
formalities – even if they had no actual effect on imports – would fall within the scope of Article 
34.84 This was a very important signal: Article 34 would, as a result, not require an actual effect 
on imports but a potential effect on interstate trade were enough; and while not expressly 
contradicting Directive 70/50,85 the Court had shown its willingness to establish its own – judicial 
– definition of MEEQR.  
This ambition to offer an autonomous definition of the scope of Article 34 was confirmed in 
Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi,86 where the Court held:  
The prohibition on quantitative restrictions covers measures which amount to a total or partial 
restraint of, according to the circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit. Measures 
having equivalent effect not only take the form of restraint described; whatever the description 
or technique employed, they can also consist of encumbrances having the same effect.87 
This suggested that Article 34 covered all “encumbrances” or hindrances amounting to even a 
“partial restraint” of imports. Yet this first – abstract – judicial definition of the scope of Article 
34 and its concept of MEEQR would soon be overshadowed by a second definition. This second 
definition was offered in Dassonville; and it is a closer analysis of that case to which we must 
now turn. 
                                                     
83  International Fruit – Judgment, paras.7-10 (emphasis added). 
84  In its written observations to the Court, the Dutch government had insisted that only the “actual application” of the 
measure could ever be contrary to Article 34 (International Fruit – Facts, 1112), while the Commission had 
expressly countered that even a potential effect on intra-Union trade was enough (ibid., 1113). On import/export 
formalities within the early customs union, see: N. Vaulont, Die Vereinfachung der Verfahren und Förmlichkeiten 
im innergemeinschaftlichen Warenverkehr im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs zum 
Verbot der Erhebung von Abgaben zollgleicher Wirkung, (1977) 12 Europarecht 1. 
85  Directive 70/50 suggested, in its Article 2(2), that import formalities would, as a rule, not be covered; yet its recital 
3 envisaged exceptions to this rule: “[w]hereas the formalities to which imports are subject do not as a general rule 
have an effect equivalent to that of quantitative restrictions and, consequently, are not covered by this Directive”. 
86  Case 2/73, Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi, [1973] ECR 865. 
87  Ibid., para.7 (emphasis added). 
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4. Enter the Protagonists: Arguments before the European Court 
Dassonville was registered in Luxembourg on 8 February 1974 and henceforth carried the case 
number 8/74.88 On 11 February, the (then) President of the Court Robert Lecourt requested 
Alexander Mackenzie Stuart – since 1973 the new British judge and a Scotsman – to act as 
Reporting Judge;89 and he also charged Alberto Trabucchi, one of the most experienced members 
on the Court, to act as Advocate-General in the case.90  
On 13 February, Lecourt allocated the case to the Second Chamber of the European Court of 
Justice,91 and two days later, pursuant to Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice,92 the Registrar of the Court notified the parties, the Member States and the Commission 
of their right to submit written observations to the Court.93 Belgium and the United Kingdom 
immediately signalled their wish to participate in the written procedure; yet neither France nor 
Germany found the case of any special importance.94 The date of oral procedure was – finally –  
set for 29 May 1974 at 10 am in the courtroom of the Court of Justice.  
Enter the protagonists.  
a. Discourse I: Observations by the Dassonvilles  
Emphasizing that they had purchased the whisky bottles in a regular manner in France, the 
Dassonvilles claimed that the requirement to possess a certificate of origin violated Article 34. 
This was so in light of Directive 70/50 and the Court’s judgment in International Fruit 
Company.95  And specifically referring to the Belgian customs rules insisting on an original 
“Customs and Excise Certificate for spirits exported to Belgium”, they argued that even if they 
                                                     
88  Interestingly, however, in the “Dassonville files” the case is consistently referred to as Fourcroy and Breuval & Cie 
v. Dassonville and Dassonville – indicating that the Court originally and, perhaps primarily, saw this as a 
“competition law” case between two exclusive dealers and two parallel importers. 
89  Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de Procédure Original 1: Affaire 8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 96. 
90  Ibid., 97. 
91   Ibid., 98. The chamber consisted of M. Sørensen (President of the Second Chamber), P. Pescatore, and A.J. 
Mackenzie Stuart. 
92  Article 20 of the (then) Protocol read: “In the cases governed by Article [267] of this Treaty, the decision of the court 
of tribunal of a Member State which suspends its proceedings and refers a case to the Court shall be notified to the 
Court by the court or tribunal concerned. The decision shall then be notified by the Registrar of the Court to the 
parties, to the Member States and to the Commission, and also to the Council if the act the validity or interpretation 
of which is in dispute originates from the Council. Within two months of this notification, the parties, the Member 
States, the Commission and, where appropriate, the Council, shall be entitled to submit statements of case or written 
observations to the Court.” 
93  Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de Procédure Original 1: Affaire 8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 95. 
94  Symptomatic for this lack of interest is the German letter by Dr Seidel, on behalf of the German Economics Ministry, 
to the ECJ Registrar (ibid., 88): “Sehr geehrter Herr Kanzler! Ich beehre mich, Ihnen mitzuteilen, daß die Regierung 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der oben bezeichneten Rechtssache keine schriftliche Stellungnahme abgeben 
wird. Für die Übersendung der Stellungnahmen der Verfahrensbeteiligten wäre ich Ihnen dankbar; die 
Bundesregierung behält sich vor, gegebenenfalls in der mündlichen Verhandlung eine Erklärung abzugeben.” 
95  Dassonville (Case) – Facts, 842: “Applying that Judgment to the facts in this case, the Dassonvilles are of the opinion 
that the certificate of origin constitutes a document to which the importation of the products in question is subject, 
the issue of which is however neither automatic nor purely a matter of form. They point out that, in the absence of 
the certificate, it is impossible both to import the products in question from countries other than the country of 
origin and to market them, and that the prohibition is absolute since any infringement is subject to penal sanctions. 
In their opinion, the rules of the Common Market are aimed not only at the liberalization of direct trade between 
the producer country and the consumer country, but also at all subsequent trade within the framework of a single 
market.” 
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had been able to directly import Scotch whisky from the United Kingdom to France on the basis 
of a British customs certificate, they would still not have been able to subsequently export the 
goods into Belgium, because the Belgian customs legislation illegally insisted on a certificate for 
spirits (directly) exported to Belgium.  
In essence: the 1934 Royal Decree “made impossible imports into Belgium from any country 
other than that in which the goods originate” because the Belgian rules “involve[d] a strict 
walling-off of markets or, at the very least, discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States, which is not justified by Article 36 of the [FEU] Treaty”.96 For even if 
the national law protected a legitimate interest under Article 36, any exception to the free 
movement principle was “subject to the strict condition that the means employed [were] not, on 
the one hand, excessive by comparison with their purpose and, on the other hand, [did] not 
constitute discrimination against certain Member States”.97  
With regard to the second preliminary question asked by the Belgian first instance judge, the 
Dassonvilles pointed to the two judgments in Béguelin and Sirena.98  According to the first 
judgment, an exclusive distribution agreement “should not be viewed strictly in isolation when 
considering whether there is absolute territorial protection; it must be judged, on the contrary, in 
the light of the economic and legal context within which it is situated”. 99  This had been 
specifically confirmed in the context of industrial and commercial property rights in Sirena; and 
this solution should also apply “where assignments and licences granted simultaneously to 
national undertakings in respect of trademark rights in the same product have the effect of 
restoring rigid frontiers between Member States”.100 For the two exclusive distributors of Scotch 
whisky within Belgium had brought the civil claim merely to protect themselves against parallel 
importers “so as to establish for themselves an absolute territorial protection”.101 This absolute 
territorial protection violated Article 101; and it mattered little that it resulted from the 
combination of the exclusive distribution agreements and national criminal law.  
b. Discourse II: Observations by the Exclusive Belgian Distributors 
In their submissions to the European Court the two exclusive distributors of Scotch whisky 
concentrated on the nature of the Belgian law governing the protection of designations of origin. 
Admitting that the 1934 law constituted a measure that had applied distinctly to imports, they 
nevertheless – and ingeniously – argued that with the adoption of the 1971 Belgian “Law on 
Commercial Practices” this character had been lost.102 For the 1971 statute now prohibited, in a 
general manner, the production or sale of a product under a designation of origin in the absence 
of a certificate of origin.103 
                                                     
96  Dassonville (Case) – Facts, 840 (emphasis added). 
97  Dassonville (Case) – Facts, 842. 
98  For a discussion of both judgments, see the Section 3(b) above. 
99  Dassonville (Case) – Facts, 842 (emphasis added). 
100  Dassonville (Case) – Facts, 843. 
101  Dassonville (Case) – Facts, 840 (emphasis added). 
102  Written Observations on behalf of Fourcroy and Breuval, in Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de 
Procédure Original 1: Affaire 8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 220 esp. at 223. 
103  The 1971 Belgian “Law on Commercial Practice” contained, in its Section 4, a legal regime with regard to Belgian 
(!) designations of origin. Its central provision stated in Article 17 (my translation): “It is prohibited: (1) To use a 
designation of origin when such a designation has not been recognized as such by a Royal Decree … (2) To produce, 
offer for sale or sell under a designation of origin products that do not correspond to the conditions laid down in 
the Royal Decree that recognises the said designation of origin; (3) To produce, offer for sale or sell under a 
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This meant in particular that the normative prism through which to explore the conformity of the 
Belgian legislation with Article 34 was Directive 70/50.104 And when examined against that 
Directive, the Belgian law did not violate European law because “the effect of such a measure on 
the free movement of goods had to be considered as inherent in the disparity of trading rules on 
designations of origin”.105 For in the eyes of the two exclusive distributors, the obstacles to trade 
did not result from the Belgian rules themselves but were, on the contrary, the result of a lack of 
Union harmonisation: 
[T]he difficulties encountered by the Dassonvilles when importing whisky into Belgium are 
the result of the lack of harmonisation among the Member States with regard to the protection 
of designations of origin, and especially in relation to spirits. For even through France is a 
contracting party to the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, she 
does not protect the designation Scotch whisky other than by an excise bond; and it is precisely 
this document that the Dassonvilles tried to use when confronted with a violation of Article 1 
of the Royal Decree n° 57 of 20 December 1934.106  
However, in the “impossible” event that the Court were to find the Belgian law to be a MEEQR, 
the two exclusive distributors claimed that it was justified under Article 36 TFEU and here in 
particular under the protection of intellectual property rights.107 Unlike traditional intellectual 
property rights, designations of origin thereby not only protected private rights but generally 
protected the collective interests of regional producers, public health and the interests of 
consumers.108 And in light of these important public policy interests, solely a document issued by 
the authorities of the country of origin could achieve the desired aims. Furthermore, pointing to 
the 1960 Franco-German Convention on the Protection of Designations of Origins, as an analogy, 
the absence of such a document would clearly entitle the importing State to refuse the very entry 
of the goods at the national frontier.109  
With regard to the competition law aspects, raised by the second preliminary question, the two 
distributors referred to the “public law” nature of the Belgian law in question and simply denied 
that the Court’s jurisprudence on mixed situations would apply. For even if the two companies 
had elected to become civil parties to the criminal case against the Dassonvilles, they had not 
“utilised” or invoked a “private” right to oppose the parallel importation into Belgium.110 Unlike 
the legal situation featuring in Béguelin, they could not have prevent the Dassonvilles from 
trading in Scotch whisky by means of invoking the (relative) territorial protection granted by the 
“Distillers Company”, because under Belgian law exclusive distributorship agreements could not 
                                                     
designation of origin products not covert by such a certificate or origin when such a certificate is required by a 
Royal Decree …”. The 1971 Law did exclusively apply to Belgian goods (and of course did not prevent their 
“importation” into Belgium); and the Commission therefore rightly rejected the claim the Belgian laws were 
indistinctly applicable. 
104  Written Observations on behalf of Fourcroy and Breuval, in supra n.102, 220 esp. at 224. 
105  Ibid. (my translation, emphasis added). 
106  Ibid., 226 (my translation). 
107  Ibid., 227. 
108  Ibid., 227-228. 
109  Ibid., 229. Article 6(2) of the French-German Convention stated: “Jeder der Vertragsstaaten ist berechtigt, von dem 
anderen Vertragsstaat zu verlangen, Erzeugnisse oder Waren, die mit einer der in den Anlagen A und B dieses 
Abkommens aufgeführten Bezeichnungen versehen sind, nur dann zur Einfuhr zuzulassen, wenn den Erzeugnissen 
oder Waren eine Bescheinigung über die Berechtigung zur Benutzung der Bezeichnung beigefügt ist. In diesem 
Falle unterliegen die Erzeugnisse oder Waren bei ihrer Einfuhr der Zurückweisung, wenn ihnen die Bescheinigung 
nicht beigefügt ist.” 
110  Ibid., 231. 
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be enforced against third parties.111 Moreover, the Belgian criminal law had operated through a 
public (!) prosecutor and the competition law provisions of the EU Treaties were consequently 
not applicable – not even indirectly.  
c. Discourse III: Observations by the intervening Member States 
The United Kingdom also objected to the idea that the Belgian law was a MEEQR. In her view, 
the Belgian law constituted not even a hindrance to trade:  
The United Kingdom considers (in particular) that the notion of potential hindrance in the 
absence of any real or effective restriction of imports or exports as compared with domestic 
commerce represents an unwarrantable extension of the clear words of the Treaty establishing 
the European [Union] … On the contrary, a person wishing to import that product is enabled 
to identify his requirements with absolute exactness and the importation is thereby rendered 
easier rather than more difficult by the elimination of the possibilities of error or 
misdescription… The United Kingdom accordingly submits that a law, regulation or 
administrative requirement prohibiting the importation as Scotch whisky of any liquor other 
than such is specifically certified as genuine is qualitative in nature and cannot be a quantitative 
restriction or measure having equivalent effect.112 
Her Majesty’s Treasury Solicitor additionally informed the Court that the costs of a British 
customs certificate were minimal and that the certificate would be available to anyone provided 
that the original export could be identified.113 (And in any case, the European Union itself had 
required a certificate of authenticity for bourbon whisky.114) In the unlikely event, however, that 
the Court were to find a violation of Article 34, the United Kingdom felt that these rules were 
                                                     
111  Belgian Code Civil, Article 1165: “Les conventions n'ont d'effet qu'entre les parties contractantes; elles ne nuisent 
point au tiers, et elles ne lui profitent que dans le cas prévu par l'article 1121.” 
112  Written Observations of the United Kingdom, in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de Procédure 
Original 1: Affaire 8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 252 at 256-257. 
113  In the oral proceedings, the United Kingdom however added a facet to this argument (Dassonville (Judgment) – 
Facts, 849-50): “The Government of the United Kingdom further explains that if it is desired to import whisky 
from France into Belgium it will be possible to obtain a retrospective certificate from the United Kingdom but 
under present arrangements it may not be an altogether simple matter. First, the rotation number and progressive 
number of the cases must be supplied. Secondly, the customs authorities will require to know the name of the 
warehouse from which the goods have been exported. If the importer will not cooperate this can be obtained with 
the cooperation of the trademark owner from the numbers referred to above and the bottler’s marks on the labels 
on the bottles. These difficulties could be overcome if importers in other Member States asked for certificates and 
passed them on to their buyers.” 
114  This argument provoked an explanation by the Commission during the oral procedure (see: Archives Historiques 
de la Commission, BAC 371/1991 (No. 1737), where the Commission pointed out that such a certification system 
was not generally required in the “common market” and that the regime for bourbon whisky was “special” in light 
of the Union negotiations in the Kennedy Round of GATT: “As regards the [Union] rules for the designation 
‘bourbon whisky’ the Commission explains that within the framework of the negotiations of the Kennedy Round 
the [Union] agreed to classify bourbon whisky in the Common Customs Tariff under a subheading more favourable 
than those for other whiskies from third countries. And, because, under GATT, the subheading ‘bourbon whisky’ 
was created within the heading ‘whisky’ the [Union] was obliged to require, in agreement with the USA, a 
certificate, not of origin, but of authenticity of the product, so as to be able to identify this whisky and thereby avoid 
the risk that whiskies other than bourbon might benefit undeservedly from the preferential tariff which the [Union] 
granted only to the latter. That was therefore a problem relating only to the tariff and which clearly does not arise 
in this case.” This was reported in Dassonville (Judgment) – Facts, 850. 
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“permitted under Article 36 as a protection of the industrial and commercial property”.115 This 
followed from international law,116 and had been expressly confirmed by the Commission.117  
The Belgian government indeed started out from the intellectual property nature of its regime 
protecting designations of origin.118 It insisted that only a certificate of origin offered by the 
authorities of the state of origin could sufficiently ensure the protection of the interests 
involved; 119  and this requirement would not constitute an import restriction because “[t]he 
Belgian authorities do not concern themselves with the nationality of the trader who, when 
exporting Scotch whisky, would need to ask the British authorities for an official document 
confirming the right of the exported products to bear the protected designation of origin”.120 In 
any case, the Belgian requirement was surely justified by Article 36 by reason of “the sovereign 
authority of the States to evaluate the national measures necessary for the protection of 
consumers”.121 It thereby did not matter whether or not other Member States – in this case: France 
– themselves required a certificate or origin; for in the absence of Union harmonisation, only a 
certificate or origin could properly protect the interests at stake.122  
d. Discourse IV: Observations by the Commission 
aa. The Scope of Article 34: General Principles  
The Commission – represented by René-Christian Béraud123 – began by abstractly defining the 
scope of Article 34. It insisted that the concept of “quantitative restriction” had been borrowed 
from the GATT, whereas the concept of MEEQR was a linguistic invention of the Rome Treaty 
designed to complement the prohibition on quotas.124 The concept would refer to “any measure, 
                                                     
115  Written Observation of the United Kingdom (supra n.112), 258 (emphasis added). 
116  Her Majesty’s government here pointed to the 1883 Paris Convention (as revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967), 
and especially Articles 1(2) and (3), which state: “(2) The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, 
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of 
origin, and the repression of unfair competition. (3) Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense 
and shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and extractive industries and 
to all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, mineral 
waters, beer, flowers, and flour.” 
117  In support of this proposition, the United Kingdom referred to the Commission’s answer to Written Question No. 
189/73, [1974] OJ C22/9, where the Commission held (ibid., 10): “However, as it is a measure aimed at protecting 
a particular registered designation of origin it is covered by Article 36 of the Treaty by virtue of which the Member 
States may maintain or introduce prohibitions or restrictions on exports which are justified, in particular, on grounds 
of the protection of industrial and commercial property.” 
118  Written Observations of the Belgian Government, in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de Procédure 
Original 1: Affaire 8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 142 at 143: “L’appellation d’origine est rangée dans la catégorie des droit 
de propriété industrielle.” 
119  Ibid., 150. 
120  Ibid. (my translation). 
121  Ibid., 151 (my translation, emphasis added).  
122  Ibid., 152. 
123  For those interested to “meet” René-Christian Béraud as the “founder” of a particular academic school on Article 
34, see: R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville (supra n.16), Chapter 2. 
124  Written Observations of the Commission, in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de Procédure Original 
1: Affaire 8/74 (CJUE – 1553), 117 at 123-124. In a footnote, Béraud expressly pointed to the parallel notion of a 
CEECD in the context of the customs union; and, referring to Case 2 and 3/62, Commission v Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium (Gingerbread), (1962) ECR 425, held that the notion of a MEEQR was a 
necessary complement to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions. 
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whatever its nature or content, that had an effect on the free movement of goods”;125 and this 
general definition had received support in the academic literature.126 The Court itself had, in the 
eyes of the Commission, confirmed this broad definition in International Fruit, when it held that 
a measure had an equivalent effect to a quota when it “hinder[ed] imports or exports which could 
otherwise take place, including measures which make importation more difficult or 
burdensome”.127  
For the Commission, this broad interpretation was nonetheless subject to an important external 
limit:  
Quantitative restrictions affect, by definition, only imports. A measure whose effect is 
equivalent to a quota must therefore also only affect imports; and this is not the case where a 
trade rule is made applicable, so as to be effective, to all products that are to be marketed. To 
qualify such rules as measures having equivalent effect simply because they have some effect 
on imports and to consequently demand their elimination vis-à-vis imported products amounts 
to refusing Member States their rightful competence to regulate trade.  
Yet neither the travaux préparatoires nor the Treaty offer any basis for this refusal; on the 
contrary: Article III (1) GATT, which the authors of the Treaty had necessarily in mind, 
expressly recognises the right of the Contracting Parties to regulate all matters relating to trade 
under the condition that such regulation does “not afford protection to domestic production”. 
Moreover, to refuse the Member States the right to regulate trade would amount to a claim 
that the Treaty tried to establish an absolute freedom of trade – a view that is certainly contrary 
to its general system and its provisions regarding the removal of obstacles to the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital. Within these four areas, the Treaty in fact only 
envisages to establish a relative freedom of movement which recognises the right of the 
Member States to generally regulate trade.128 
This sovereign right to regulate “internal” trade encountered nevertheless, according to the 
Commission, some limits; and the idea of an “abuse of right” was found useful in this respect.129  
                                                     
125  Written Observations of the Commission (supra n.124), 124 (my translation). Béraud referred to the Commission’s 
answer(s) in response to the Written Question(s) asked by Deringer – discussed in R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville 
(supra n.16), Chapter 2. 
126  Written Observations of the Commission (supra n.124), 125 – footnote 4 (in which Béraud quotes himself as an 
academic authority, see his “Les mesures d’effet équivalent au sens des articles 30 et suivants du Traité de Rome”, 
(1968) 4 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeén 265). 
127  Written Observations of the Commission (supra n.124), 126. During the oral procedure, the Commission had 
expressly argued against the idea that Article 34 TFEU required “discrimination” (Archives Historiques de la 
Commission, BAC 371/1991 (No. 1737), 50): “Tout comme l’exigence d’un effet réel sur les importations, 
l’exigence que la mesure – pour revêtir la qualification de mesure d’effet équivalent – ait un effet discriminatoire 
serait ajouter une condition supplémentaires qui n’est pas prévue par le Traité. Certes, le principe de non-
discrimination est un principe général qui se retrouve dans nombre de disposions du Traité, notamment dans celles 
relatives aux 3 autre libertés (personnes, service, capitaux). Mais les règles du traité relatives à la libre circulation 
des marchandises vont plus loin : elles interdisent par exemple l’instauration d’un droit de douane ou d’un 
contingent qu’ils soient ou non discriminatoires. Ainsi, un droit de douane ou un contingent sont-ils interdites, 
même en l’absence de production nationale. Il droit en être de même des taxes d’effet équivalent à un droit de 
douane et des mesures d’effet équivalent à un contingent qui sont interdites par le traité, qu’elles soit ou non 
discriminatoires pour le produit importé concerné.” 
128  Written Observation of the Commission (supra n.124), 126-127 (my translation, emphasis added). 
129  Ibid., 128. This directly drew on Béraud’s academic work, see supra n.126. 
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bb. The Belgian Rules and Article 34  
What did this mean for the Belgian laws in the present case? For Béraud, the Belgian rules were 
not indistinctly but distinctly applicable to imports:  
Such rules, applied to imported products alone, are capable of making the importation of these 
products impossible when they find themselves in free circulation in Member States, like 
France, that do not require such a document. Furthermore, even if that document could be 
obtained, it would, it seems, not be accepted by the Belgian authorities in the absence of the 
name and the address of the Belgian importer. We are therefore dealing with rules that make 
the entry of imported goods into the national market dependent on a condition that is 
impossible to fulfil for goods that are imported from a Member State different from the State 
from which they originate.  
However, by virtue of Article [28 (2) TFEU], the provisions especially Chapter [3] of Title [2] 
which contain Articles [34] et seq., “apply to products originating in Member States and to 
products coming from third countries which are in free circulation in Member States”. Such 
rules must therefore be qualified as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions on imports. They violate the obligations imposed on the Member States by virtue 
of Article [34 TFEU], which have also been made explicit by the Commission in its Directive 
[70/50].130 
The Commission thus clearly held the Belgian rules to be distinctly applicable in that they 
“applied to imported products alone” and were even “capable of precluding imports of the 
products in question” that were “in free circulation in Member States”.131  
Could the Belgian rules however be justified under Article 36, and in particular on the ground of 
“the protection of industrial and commercial property”?132 For the Commission, such a solution 
would represent a “complete closure of all trade channels other than direct imports”;133 and in 
light of the existence of less restrictive alternatives, which could bring about the same level of 
protection, the national measure could not be justified under Article 36.134  
cc. The Belgian Rules and Article 101  
With regard to the second preliminary question on EU competition law, the Commission 
observations were much shorter. Admitting that Belgian civil law did not allow an exclusive 
distribution agreement to be enforced against third parties, the question arose whether the 
combined effect of the private agreement and the public legislation on certificates of origin 
nevertheless violated Article 101. Pointing to the Court’s jurisprudence starting with Consten & 
Grundig,135 the Commission felt that particular attention had to be paid to the economic and legal 
                                                     
130  Ibid., 132 (my translation, emphasis added). 
131  Dassonville (Judgment) – Facts, 847. 
132  Witten Observations of the Commission (supra n.124), 132 (my translation). 
133  Ibid., 133 (my translation). 
134  And it was the very same reasoning that would also offer a solution in the event that the Court considered the 
Belgian measure “indistinctly applicable”, even if the Commission believed to have shown that this was not the 
case, cf. Written Observations of the Commission (supra n.124), 134. The analysis of this point is much more 
extensive in the oral observations, where the Commission also expressly referred to Case 155/73, Sacchi, see: 
Archives Historiques de la Commission, BAC 371/1991 (No. 1737), 57. 
135  Written Observations of the Commission (supra n.124), 137. 
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context in which the agreements in this case were situated. And expressly referring to Béguelin, 
the Commission here argued as follows: 
Although an exclusive dealing agreement does not, in itself, contain all the elements necessary 
to attract the prohibition of Article [101] (1) it can have the effect of restricting trade when, 
considered separately or in conjunction with parallel agreements, it confers on concessionaires, 
in law or in fact, an absolute territorial protection against parallel imports of the products 
concerned. These agreements are prohibited under Article [101] (1) and are not, as a general 
rule, likely to be authorized on the basis of Article [101] (3). In the Commission’s view, for 
the prohibition of Article [101] of the [FEU] Treaty to be applicable, it suffices that the 
exclusive dealing agreement should give concessionaires the possibility of preventing parallel 
imports into the contract territory by invoking national laws on unfair competition, and that 
the concessionaire should avail himself of this possibility.136 
While here admitting that the national criminal law operated without a “private” exercise of rights 
by the two exclusive distributors of Scotch whisky in Belgium, the Commission nonetheless felt 
that the effects of the civil action “combine with those inherent in the national rules in question, 
which can in particular consist of the award of damages to the exclusive importers and 
distributors”.137 Or, to put it differently: even if the Belgian law in question was of a “public” 
nature in that it would be automatically enforced by public authorities, the combined effect of the 
Belgian law and the exclusive distribution agreements was to offer absolute territorial protection 
– a consequence that was clearly prohibited by Article 101 TFEU. 
5. Enter the “Court”: Advocate-General Opinion and Court Judgment  
a. The Opinion of Advocate-General Trabucchi 
Publically delivered on 20 June 1974, three weeks before the Court gave judgment, and originally 
written in Italian, Advocate-General Trabucchi’s opinion unashamedly concentrated on the first 
preliminary question, that is: whether or not the Belgian law constituted a MEEQR under Article 
34.138 
The seasoned Advocate-General started by reminding the Court of the function of certificates of 
origin within free trade areas: in the absence of a common external customs border, it was 
necessary to distinguish between goods produced by the Member States themselves and goods 
coming from third countries outside the trading block. This “customs function” of certificates of 
origin was however otiose for the Union, since the latter was based on a customs union in which 
the free circulation of third-country goods was guaranteed once “the import formalities have been 
complied with and any customs duties or charges having an equivalent effect which are payable 
have been levied in that Member State” – here France.139 
States had nonetheless remained free, in the absence of Union harmonisation, to protect foreign 
designations of origin. This freedom was however not unlimited; and Trabucchi now indulged in 
a nuanced analysis of the potential effect of the Belgian law on the free movement of goods in 
                                                     
136  Dassonville (Judgment) – Facts, 848 (emphasis added). 
137  Ibid. In the oral procedure, the Dassonvilles claimed that the criminal action had resulted from a complaint, by the 
two competitors. 
138  According to the Advocate-General, the competition law aspect raised by Dassonville was “of minor importance” 
(Dassonville (Judgment) – Advocate-General, 863).  
139  On the status of third country goods and Articles 28 and 29 TFEU, see supra n.46. 
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general and parallel imports by non-authorized traders in particular. The Advocate-General 
thereby analysed a number of scenarios beginning with the extreme case in which parallel imports 
were completely prevented “where the certificate of origin is required to be made out directly in 
the name of the importer”.140  But even under a softer scenario in which a certificate could 
subsequently be obtained from the British customs authorities, the Belgian rules were problematic: 
“[T]he need to possess the precise details enabling the batch in question to be correctly identified 
as the subject of a particular export, makes it in practice rather difficult, if not completely 
impossible, to obtain this certificate, especially for small quantities forming part of a larger 
consignment.”141 This was particularly the case where help had to come from within an exclusive 
distribution network. In essence: 
The result of this is in practice completely to prevent freedom of movement between the 
various national markets, such movement as there is running along a single well-defined path 
and involving the recognized likelihood of differences, objectively unjustified, in the price of 
a particular product from one Member State to another. The products in question can in fact be 
imported legally into Belgium only by exclusive concessionaires or agents of the producers, 
since the latter are the only ones having access to direct supplies and they can therefore obtain 
the certificate of origin without any difficulty.142 
This was a clear reference to Consten & Grundig; yet unlike the private use of a national 
trademark law in that case,143 this time it was the automatic operation of the – public – Belgian 
criminal law itself that constituted the obstacle to the free movement of goods.  
Having thus identified the trade-restrictive effect of the Belgian law on the free movement of 
(parallel) imports, Trabucchi’s second analytical step explored the Union tools available to 
remove the national trade restriction. Beginning with Article 115 TFEU and the harmonization of 
national laws, this first option was swiftly rejected. For in the view of Trabucchi, the restriction 
to intra-Union trade in the present case did not stem from a disparity between national laws. (For 
even if the relevant French legislation had been identical, the practical problems in obtaining the 
said certificates at second or third hand would have continued to exist.) The hindering effect did, 
in his view, therefore “result directly from the law of the State which imposes this requirement”; 
and this meant that Article 34 was potentially the sole method for removing the undesirable 
obstacle to trade.144 Having briefly analysed Directive 70/50, the Advocate-General nonetheless 
chartered his own course here. For instead of following the Commission’s categorisation into 
distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures, Trabucchi now set out a “first-principles” 
approach that warrants to be quoted at length:  
The right of freedom of movement within the [Union] of goods which are in free circulation in 
a Member State constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty. A trade rule 
enacted by a State which is unlike a quota but which, considered in the context in which it 
applies, is capable of seriously hindering intra-[Union] trade in certain categories of goods, 
must be regarded in principle as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative 
restriction. 
Contrary to the opinion of the British Government, the prohibition on measures having an 
effect equivalent to quotas is not subject, for its application, to the condition that there should 
actually be a quantitative reduction in the movement of goods between Member States. In 
                                                     
140  Dassonville (Judgment) – Advocate-General Opinion, 856. 
141  Dassonville (Judgment) – Advocate-General Opinion, 857. 
142  Ibid. 
143  For a discussion of Consten & Grundig, see Section 3(a) above. 
144  Dassonville (Judgment) – Advocate-General Opinion, 858 (emphasis added). 
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accordance with the reasoning adopted by the Court in its case law on the subject of customs 
duties and measures having equivalent effect, which satisfies requirements of logic and 
practice, the prohibition operates automatically by reason of the sole fact that the measures in 
question, even though not discriminatory or protectionist, constitute an unjustified additional 
burden for importers, which means that they are liable to restrict, in an improper manner, 
intra-[Union] trade (Judgment No 2-3/69, Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders). This 
corresponds precisely with the text of the Treaty, which provides, on the expiry of the 
transitional period, for the prohibition, in the same absolute and automatic manner, of both 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect, independently of proof in 
individual cases of the quantitative effects which the measure in question actually had on 
trade.145 
The Advocate-General here drew a direct analogy between Article 34 and the case law on customs 
duties and charges having an equivalent effect by insisting that the same absolute principles 
should apply to measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions.146 
And having identified the Belgian law as a MEEQR, Trabucchi moved to the third step in his 
analysis. Could the law be justified by means of Article 36, and especially on the ground of the 
protection of industrial and commercial property rights? The Advocate-General’s view here was 
complex yet brilliant: 
The protection of designations of origin of products is covered by the principle of protection 
of industrial and commercial property for which Article 36 allows necessary derogations to the 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect. However, on the 
basis of this rule, States can derogate in the said manner only for the purpose of the protection 
of their own interests and not for the protection of the interests of other States … Article 36 
allows every State the right to protect exclusively its own national interests. Consequently, for 
the purpose of protecting industrial and commercial property, each State can restrict the 
freedom of movement of goods only with reference to the protection of individual rights and 
economic interests falling under its own sphere of interest. In the context of property rights, it 
is clear that the protection of a designation of origin relates to the economic interest of the 
producer. Consequently, in the case of a foreign product, and even more so where a third State 
is involved, the interest to be protected lies outside the sphere of interest which every State is 
allowed by virtue of Article 36.147  
For Trabucchi, then, a national law protecting foreign designations of origin could not be justified 
on the ground of protecting domestic industrial and commercial property. 148  Yet in the 
(hypothetical) event that the Court would find another public policy ground available, he 
nevertheless continued his analysis by pointing out that no national law falling within one of the 
grounds mentioned in Article 36 must ever be a means of an arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States. And returning to his nuanced analysis of 
the restrictive effects of the Belgian law, outlined above, he ultimately concluded that whatever 
the private or public interests protected by the Belgian law “importers who have not received the 
goods directly from the country of origin must at least be allowed to prove their authenticity by 
                                                     
145  Ibid., 859 (emphasis added). 
146  For an academic discussion of this point, see R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville (supra n.16), Chapter 1.  
147  Dassonville (Judgment) – Advocate-General Opinion, 860 (emphasis added). 
148  Ibid. 860-1 (emphasis added): “It appears to me, therefore, that one can completely reject the argument that Article 
36 allows a Member State to apply in respect of imports from other Member States restrictive measures having an 
effect equivalent to quotas for the purpose of protecting the designations of origin of products of third States.” I 
take the reference to a “third State” here to refer to the United Kingdom not (yet) being a Member State of the 
Union when the facts of Dassonville occurred. 
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any other means definitely establishing this fact”.149 The Belgian law would therefore always 
constitute an unnecessary and disguised restriction of trade. 
What about the second preliminary question and the potential violation of European competition 
law? Trabucchi found it an “easy” question: “No interest other than the maintenance of an 
exclusive position can have induced the Belgian concessionaires to invoke a rule protecting the 
designation of origin of goods[.]”150 Yet recognising the “public” nature of the Belgian legislation, 
the Advocate-General admitted that the initiative to invoke the law would have come ex officio 
from a public prosecutor and that the restriction on competition therefore derived “directly from 
the national law itself”.151 He nevertheless felt that “the combined effect” of the domestic law and 
the behaviour of the private undertakings led to “an actual division of national markets resulting 
in the isolation of some of these from intra-[Union] trade”, which permitted him to “deduce from 
this the existence of a concerted practice intended to ensure the absolute territorial protection of 
the national market in question”.152 And for Trabucchi, this was a practice that could render the 
exclusive distribution agreements illegal under Article 101 TFEU. 
b. Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville: The Text  
Having mysteriously moved from the Second Chamber to the Full Court, the Court of Justice 
delivered its judgment in Dassonville on 11 July 1974. What had prompted the decision to move 
the case to the Full Court? What had the Reporting Judge originally proposed; and what 
deliberations had been conducted “inside” the Court? We shall (probably) never know.153  
All we have therefore are fifteen short paragraphs in search of meaning. They read as follows: 
Law 
1. By Judgment of 11 January 1974, received at the Registry of the Court on 8 February 1974, 
the Tribunal de Première Instance of Brussels referred, under Article [267] of the [FEU] Treaty, 
two questions on the interpretation of Articles [34-36 and 101] of the [FEU] Treaty, relating to 
the requirement of an official document issued by the government of the exporting country for 
products bearing a designation of origin.  
2. By the first question it is asked whether a national provision prohibiting the import of goods 
bearing a designation of origin where such goods are not accompanied by an official document 
issued by the government of the exporting country certifying their right to such designation 
constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within the 
meaning of Article [34] of the Treaty.  
3. This question was raised within the context of criminal proceedings instituted in Belgium 
against traders who duly acquired a consignment of Scotch whisky in free circulation in France 
and imported it into Belgium without being in possession of a certificate of origin from the 
British customs authorities, thereby infringing Belgian rules. 
4. It emerges from the file and from the oral proceedings that a trader, wishing to import into 
Belgium Scotch whisky which is already in free circulation in France, can obtain such a 
                                                     
149  Ibid., 862-3. 
150  Ibid., 863 (emphasis added). 
151  Ibid (emphasis added). 
152  Ibid., 864 (emphasis added). 
153  Having visited the private archive of Judge Mackenzie Stuart in Cambridge in the hope of finding the “lost” draft 
judgment or the “délibéré”, I still left empty-handed. Sincere thanks nonetheless go to the Sidney Sussex College 
archivist Mr Nicholas Rogers for granting me access in 2016.  
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certificate only with great difficulty, unlike the importer who imports directly from the 
producer country. 
5. All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[Union] trade are to be considered as measures having 
an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. 
6. In the absence of a [Union] system guaranteeing for consumers the authenticity of a 
product’s designation of origin, if a Member State takes measures to prevent unfair practices 
in this connexion, it is however subject to the condition that these measures should be 
reasonable and that the means of proof required should not act as a hindrance to trade between 
Member States and should, in consequence, be accessible to all [Union] nationals. 
7. Even without having to examine whether or not such measures are covered by Article 36, 
they must not, in any case, by virtue of the principle expressed in the second sentence of that 
Article, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States. 
8. That may be the case with formalities, required by a Member State for the purpose of proving 
the origin of a product, which only direct importers are really in a position to satisfy without 
facing serious difficulties. 
9. Consequently, the requirement by a Member State of a certificate of authenticity which is 
less easily obtainable by importers of an authentic product which has been put into free 
circulation in a regular manner in another Member State than by importers of the same product 
coming directly from the country of origin constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent 
to a quantitative restriction as prohibited by the Treaty. 
10. By the second question it is asked whether an agreement the effect of which is to restrict 
competition and adversely to affect trade between Member States when taken in conjunction 
with a national rule with regard to certificates of origin is void when that agreement merely 
authorizes the exclusive importer to exploit that rule for the purpose of preventing parallel 
imports or does not prohibit him from doing so. 
11. An exclusive dealing agreement falls within the prohibition of Article [101] when it 
impedes, in law or in fact, the importation of the products in question from other Member 
States into the protected territory by persons other than the exclusive importer. 
12. More particularly, an exclusive dealing agreement may adversely affect trade between 
Member States and can have the effect of hindering competition if the concessionaire is able 
to prevent parallel imports from other Member States into the territory covered by the 
concession by means of the combined effects of the agreement and a national law requiring the 
exclusive use of a certain means of proof of authenticity. 
13. For the purpose of judging whether this is the case, account must be taken not only of the 
rights and obligations flowing from the provisions of the agreement, but also of the legal and 
economic context in which it is situated and, in particular, the possible existence of similar 
agreements concluded between the same producer and concessionaires established in other 
Member States. 
14. In this connexion, the maintenance within a Member State of prices appreciably higher 
than those in force in another Member State may prompt an examination as to whether the 
exclusive dealing agreement is being used for the purpose of preventing importers from 
obtaining the means of proof of authenticity of the product in question, required by national 
rules of the type envisaged by the question. 
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15. However, the fact that an agreement merely authorizes the concessionaire to exploit such 
a national rule or does not prohibit him from doing so, does not suffice, in itself, to render the 
agreement null and void. 
And in light of these judicial reasons, the Court held:  
The Court  
In answer to the questions referred to it by the Tribunal de Première Instance of Brussels by 
Judgment of 11 January 1974, hereby rules:  
1. The requirement of a Member State of a certificate of authenticity which is less easily 
obtainable by importers of an authentic product which has been put into free circulation in a 
regular manner in another Member State than by importers of the same product coming directly 
from the country of origin constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative 
restriction as prohibited by the Treaty.  
2. The fact that an agreement merely authorizes the concessionaire to exploit such a national 
rule or does not prohibit him from doing so does not suffice, in itself, to render the agreement 
null and void.  
6. “Re-reading” Dassonville I: Interpreting the Judgment  
Barely filling three printed pages in the iconic purple “European Court Reports”, the Dassonville 
judgment is short – very short. Having restated the procedural background in paragraph 1, the 
judgment is almost evenly divided into a free movement part (paragraphs 2-9) and a competition 
law part (paragraphs 10-15). Let us look at both in turn. 
a. Free Movement I: The Concept of “Measures having Equivalent Effect” 
The Court begins the free movement part by briefly summarizing the substantive issues in 
paragraphs 2-3. It here characterises the Belgian law as “a national provision prohibiting the 
import of goods”, while also emphasising that the goods in question were “in free circulation” 
within the Union – a wording that hinted at their third-country origin. And by characterising the 
Belgian law as requiring “a certificate of origin from the British customs authorities”, it seems 
that the Court saw the Belgian law as a customs measure that was distinctly applicable to imports. 
Paragraph 4 then presents the central problem of the case: underlining, once more, that the British 
goods were already “in free circulation in France”, the Court states that imports from France 
would have “great difficulty, unlike the importer who imports directly from the producer country” 
to obtain the legally required British customs certificate. And from there the Court continues in 
paragraphs 5 and 6 with a general definition of what constitutes a MEEQR: 
All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[Union] trade are to be considered as measures having 
an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. In the absence of a [Union] system 
guaranteeing for consumers the authenticity of a product’s designation of origin, if a Member 
State takes measures to prevent unfair practices in this connexion, it is however subject to the 
condition that these measures should be reasonable and that the means of proof required should 
not act as a hindrance to trade between Member States and should, in consequence, be 
accessible to all [Union] nationals. 
Devoid of any references to its previous jurisprudence (and with no alternative normative pointers, 
such as Directive 70/50, which would frame its analysis), what were the Court’s intellectual and 
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textual inspirations? And more importantly still: what was the Court hoping to “do” in offering 
its famous definition?  
For the Court, the effect of the 1934 Royal Decree, especially as interpreted by the Belgian 
customs circulars, was to stop imports not accompanied by a British Customs Certificate at the 
Belgian border.154 The national law could therefore easily be classified as a “border measure” that 
distinctly applied to imports; and by requiring an official customs certificate as “entry document”, 
a first jurisprudential pointer for the Dassonville Court must undoubtedly have been International 
Fruit.155 It may be recalled that in that case, the Court had held Article 34 to preclude “the 
application to intra-[Union] trade of a provision which require[d], even as a pure formality, import 
or export licences or any other similar procedure”;156 and the requested certificate undoubtedly 
constituted an import formality.157  
Yet International Fruit had concerned direct imports, and doubts existed as to whether the 
judgment would also extend to indirect import of goods already in free circulation within the 
Union.158 Paragraph 5 of Dassonville now answered this question. Drawing on its established 
“pattern-of-trade” test – developed in the context of EU competition law – the Court here 
confirmed that Article 34 captured quantitative as well as qualitative restrictions of trade between 
Member States; and since the Belgian law favoured direct British imports over indirect imports 
from France, it indirectly affected trade between Member States. To also counter the British 
argument that potential effects on trade could not be captured by European law – an argument 
previously made before the Court159 - the Dassonville definition of MEEQR equally re-clarified 
                                                     
154  It will be recalled that Article 1 of the 1934 Belgian Royal Decree prohibits already the “import” of goods not 
accompanied by an official document proving its right to use a foreign designation of origin. The subsequently 
adopted customs circulars only clarified which type of document was needed. 
155  Case 51-54/71, International Fruit Company (supra n.79). 
156  International Fruit, para.9 (emphasis added). 
157  If any additional proof were needed, consider the “Supplementary Answer” of the Commission to Written Question 
No. 44/78, [1979] OJ C 253/4-5 (emphasis added): “As the Court has pointed out on numerous occasions, Article 
[34] et seq. of the Treaty forbid the application in intra-[Union] relations of national legislation requiring, even as 
a purely formal measure, the production of import or export licences, or compliance with any similar procedure, 
other than in exceptional cases covered by [Union] law. Such formalities are regarded as measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, which are prohibited by the abovementioned 
Treaty Articles. Clearly, making imports subject to the production of certificates of origin constitutes a like 
measure. Irrespective of the conditions upon which an origin certificate is issued, or the purposes for which it is 
required, the very fact of requiring it constitutes a formality liable to make the importation of products subject to 
it more difficult, and hence is ‘capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[Union] 
trade’. A certificate of origin required for products originating in the [Union] or for products originating in non-
member countries, but in free circulation, constitutes a formality which is incompatible with the rules set out in 
Article [34] et seq. of the Treaty.”  
158  Advocate-General Roemer in International Fruit had indeed suggested that Article 34 was concerned exclusively 
with direct imports. Drawing on the liberalizing code of the OEEC and the GATT, he claimed in International 
Fruit (supra n.79), 1123 that “[a]ccording to those provisions [Article 34] encompasses national measures which 
wholly or in part preclude direct [emphasis in original] imports which are not based on technical features (which 
also apply to the marketing of domestic products), but rather solely relate to the number and quantity of the products 
in question”. This solution had also been suggested by the Commission in its answer to Written Question 236/74, 
[1974] OJ C 121/15.There is only one specific provision that arguably dealt with parallel imports in the Rome 
Treaty and this was ex-Article 91 EEC (“Dumping”), whose paragraph 2 stated (emphasis added): “As soon as this 
Treaty enters into force, products which originate in or are in free circulation in one Member State and which have 
been exported to another Member State shall, on reimportation, be admitted into the territory of the first—
mentioned State free of all customs duties, quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect.” 
However, a literal reading confined the provision to reimportation into the Member State where the goods were 
produced or first brought into circulation within the Union. 
159  The argument had been made in Consten & Grundig as well as International Fruit. 
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that actual as well as potential hindrances to intra-Union would be captured. And to express both 
of these ideas in one formula, the Court brilliantly recruited a textual formula that had already 
made a distinguished career within European competition law.160 
But what was the meaning of this act of doctrinal transplantation? What was the intention of the 
Court in employing a competition law formula within Article 34? One understanding could be 
this: Dassonville concerned a “mixed situation” in which national legislation combined with a set 
of exclusive distribution agreements to re-create national barriers to trade; and the use of the 
Consten/Dassonville formula was intended to underline the symbiotic complementarity of the 
competition law provisions and the rules establishing the free movement of goods. Within the 
context of competition law, it may be recalled, the “effect-on-trade” criterion thereby operates 
primarily as a jurisdictional criterion that delineates “the field of application of the prohibition by 
laying down the condition that it may be assumed that there is a possibility that the realization of 
a single market between Member States might be impeded”;161 and the Dassonville Court now 
projected this “jurisdictional” frame into the context of the free movement of goods. (However, 
unlike the “neutral” pattern-of-trade formulation in the context of EU competition law, the express 
reference to a “hindering” effect on imports potentially suggested that the Dassonville formula 
could generally operate as a substantive decision rule. That this was nevertheless not the case 
would however be shown in the post-Dassonville jurisprudence.162) 
Be that as it may, the famous formula in paragraph 5 is immediately followed by a substantive 
qualification in paragraph 6, where the Court acknowledges that in the absence of Union 
legislation,163 the Member States had remained free to guarantee consumer protection and to 
“take[] measures to prevent unfair practices in this connexion”. But this freedom was itself 
“subject to the condition that these measures should be reasonable” and accessible to all EU 
nationals. Alas, where did the qualification to the Dassonville formula – and the qualification of 
                                                     
160  In Consten & Grundig, the Court had thus held (ibid., 341): “The concept of an agreement ‘which may affect trade 
between Member States’ is intended to define, in the law governing cartels, the boundary between the areas 
respectively covered by [Union] law and national law. It is only to the extent to which the agreement may affect 
trade between Member States that the deterioration in competition caused by the agreement falls under the 
prohibition of [Union] law contained in Article [101]; otherwise it escapes the prohibition. In this connexion, what 
is particularly important is whether the agreement is capable of constituting a threat, either direct or indirect, actual 
or potential, to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the 
objectives of a single market between States.” According to Pescatore’s “Vade-mecum” (Bruylant, 2007), 300, the 
case behind the Dassonville formula was really Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, 
[1966] ECR 235; yet it was Consten & Grundig – and not its relatively unknown predecessor – that was cited in 
the Written Observations. (But of course, Pescatore was present when the judicial deliberations took place.) Be that 
as it may, in Société Technique Minière, the Court had held (ibid., 249): “This provision, clarified by the 
introductory words of Article [101] which refers to agreements in so far as they are ‘incompatible with the Common 
Market’, is directed to determining the field of application of the prohibition by laying down the condition that it 
may be assumed that there is a possibility that the realization of a single market between Member States might be 
impeded. It is in fact to the extent that the agreement may affect trade between Member States that the interference 
with competition caused by that agreement is caught by the prohibitions in [Union] law found in Article [101], 
whilst in the converse case it escapes those prohibitions. For this requirement to be fulfilled it must be possible to 
foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the 
agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member States.” 
161  Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière (supra n.160), 249. On the jurisdictional quality of the effect-an-trade-test 
in general, see: R. Schütze, European Union Law (supra n.61), Chapter 17 – Section 1. 
162  The immediate post-Dassonville jurisprudence indeed shows that the Court primarily developed the Dassonville 
formula as a jurisdictional criterion that only comes close to a substantive decision rule in the context of border 
measures. On this point, see: R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville (supra n.16), Chapter 4. 
163  See the Proposal for a Council Directive on the harmonization of procedures for the release of goods into free 
circulation, [1974] OJ C 14/45. 
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the qualification – in paragraph 6 textually or spiritually come from? What were the Court’s 
sources of inspiration here? The reference to the law on “unfair practices” revealed, once more, 
the competition law context of the entire Dassonville case; and it is – according to a first possible 
view – from here that the “rule of reason” in paragraph 6 was imported. According to a second 
view, on the other hand, the Court derived its “rule of reason” from Article 3 of Directive 70/50;164 
yet in light of the marked absence of the Directive in the text of the Dassonville judgment, this 
view is hard to defend – especially because the Court regarded the 1934 Belgian law as a distinctly 
applicable measure. There is, finally, a third view; and one – as the post-Dassonville jurisprudence 
would decisively confirm – that should have been the strongest source of inspiration for paragraph 
6: the Court’s previous judgment in International Fruit.165  
International Fruit had, as we saw above, distinguished between imports of goods from within 
the Union and imports of goods from third States; and while an absolute prohibition on import 
formalities applied in the former scenario, in the absence of Union harmonisation, a rule of reason 
applied, by contrast, to import formalities for goods coming from third States. Within the 
Dassonville context, this however meant the following: the Belgian rules when applied to direct 
imports from the United Kingdom – still a third State when our 84 bottles were imported – could 
have been legitimate; and since the Belgian law in Dassonville generally applied to all imports 
regardless of their origin, the Court may have wished to extend its rule of reason from direct to 
indirect imports of third country goods. Viewed in this light, Dassonville becomes an extension 
of International Fruit: in the absence of harmonised customs rules, the Member States may 
continue to adopt reasonable customs formalities for third country goods – whether directly 
imported or already in free circulation within the common market. Dassonville is here no 
“Jacobean” judgment establishing a “transnational market-place which is identical to a national 
market-pace” (Weiler) but a parallel imports case that simply follows the internal logic of an 
international customs union. 
b. Free Movement II: Article 36 and the Question of Justification 
Without having expressly found the Belgian law an unreasonable restriction to intra-Union trade, 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment see the Court shift its focus to an analysis of Article 36, and 
its limits. They state:  
Even without having to examine whether or not such measures are covered by Article 36, they 
must not, in any case, by virtue of the principle expressed in the second sentence of that Article, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States. That may be the case with formalities, required by a Member State for the 
                                                     
164  For the text of Article 3 of the Directive, see supra n.77. But while the Directive indeed covered third country goods 
in free circulation (ibid., Preamble (emphasis added): “Whereas the provisions concerning the abolition of 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect between Member States apply both to products 
originating in and exported by Member States and to products originating in third countries and put into free 
circulation in the other Member States”); the problem for the Court was perhaps that neither Articles 2 or 3 were 
drafted to expressly refer to a situation where a national rule limited parallel imports at the expense of direct 
imports. The comparisons within the Directive are always between imported and domestic goods. A good example 
here is, within the context of customs procedures, Article 2(3) (r), which positively defines as MEEQR those 
national rules that “subject imported products to controls or, other than those inherent in the customs clearance 
procedure, to which domestic products are not subject or which are stricter in respect of imported products than 
they are in respect of domestic products, without this being necessary in order to ensure equivalent protection”. 
165  This “rule of reason” thinking was only implicit in International Fruit; yet it becomes much clearer in the post-
Dassonville case law. As we saw above (supra n.83), what paragraph 10 of International Fruit had done was simply 
to state that the application of Article 34 to imports from third-countries was subject to harmonisation under the 
Common Commercial Policy (or the Common Agricultural Policy). 
 
“Re-reading” Dassonville 
European University Institute 35 
purpose of proving the origin of a product, which only direct importers are really in a position 
to satisfy without facing serious difficulties.166 
The Court here wholeheartedly adopts the intellectual shortcut that had been previously suggested 
by Advocate-General Trabucchi. For even if designations of origins were industrial and 
commercial property rights,167 it was far from clear whether the Belgian law could have been 
justified under Article 36 on the ground of – extraterritorially – protecting British industrial or 
commercial property rights. The Court therefore rightly concentrated, from the very beginning, 
on the formal limits governing Article 36 as such and here analysed whether the Belgian law 
possibly constituted an arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade. 
And finding that “only direct importers [were] really in a position to satisfy [the Belgian law] 
without facing serious difficulties”, the Court had indeed no difficulties in holding that the 
national law was in fact unjustifiable.168 A source of additional inspiration may here have come 
from Hag I – a case decided a week before Dassonville and having the same Reporting Judge.169 
c. Competition Law: Article 101 and the Exclusive Distribution Agreements  
What about the second preliminary question and its emphasis on EU competition law? Would the 
exclusive distribution agreements concluded, respectively, by Fourcroy and Breuval violate 
Article 101? The answer the Court gives in paragraphs 11 and 12 was – especially in light of its 
previous Béguelin judgment – fairly succinct. It held: 
An exclusive dealing agreement falls within the prohibition of Article [101] when it impedes, 
in law or in fact, the importation of the products in question from other Member States into the 
protected territory by persons other than the exclusive importer. More particularly, an exclusive 
dealing agreement may adversely affect trade between Member States and can have the effect 
of hindering competition if the concessionaire is able to prevent parallel imports from other 
Member States into the territory covered by the concession by means of the combined effects 
of the agreement and a national law requiring the exclusive use of a certain means of proof of 
authenticity.170 
                                                     
166  Dassonville – Judgement, paras.7 and 8. 
167  For this point see in particular the Commission’s answer to Written Question 189/73, [1974] OJ C22/9 at 10: “[A]s 
it is a measure aimed at protecting a particular registered designation of origin it is covered by Article 36 of the 
Treaty by virtue of which the Member States may maintain or introduce prohibitions or restrictions on exports 
which are justified, in particular, on grounds of the protection of industrial and commercial property.” Many early 
commentators indeed “read” Dassonville as part of the Court’s jurisprudence on intellectual property rights. See 
only: R. Joliet, EEC Law and Appellations of Origin: The Scottish Whisky Case, (1975) 38 Modern Law Review 
200: “The recent Scotch Whisky case before the European Court of Justice has for the first time drawn attention to 
a possible conflict between national law relating to the protection of appellations of origin, one of the branches of 
industrial property law according to the Paris Union Convention and Community Law.” Joliet here criticised the 
Court for its “reasonableness” criterion because it should have used the specific subject matter doctrine (ibid., 204): 
“In my view, the Deutsche Grammophone rule would have been preferable to the reasonableness test adopted by 
the Court: restrictions on imports should be considered as being covered by the exception of Article 36 in so far as 
they are justified by the specific subject matter of the industrial property right at issue. This already implies the 
reasonableness of the means of proof imposed to demonstrate the specific qualities that products bearing 
appellations of origin must have.” 
168  This point is expressly made in paragraph 9 of the Dassonville judgment. 
169  Case 192/73, Van Zuylen frères v Hag AG, [1974] ECR 731. The Court here stated (ibid., para.14) that “[w]hilst in 
[a common] market the indication of origin of a product covered by a trade mark is useful, information to consumers 
on this point may be ensured by means other than such as would affect the free movement of goods”. It is probably 
from this case that the reference to consumer protection in Dassonville came from. 
170  Dassonville – Judgment, paras.11-12. 
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The Court here simply confirmed that a private agreement must always be placed within its legal 
and economic context;171 and that the combined effect of an agreement and national law could 
lead to absolute territorial protection. However, as the Belgian law was a criminal law whose 
enforcement was not dependent on a private party invoking its right, the Court held that the mere 
fact that a sole distributor benefited from a national rule on certificates of origin could not, as 
such, render the underlying agreement unlawful.172 This seemed to suggest, as the two exclusive 
dealers had argued, that only those national laws that required active “utilisation” by private 
parties could fall within the Court’s jurisprudence on mixed situations under Article 101. In the 
present case, the “public” nature of the law however meant that solely the free movement of goods 
provisions, and not the “private” competition law rules, controlled the case. 
7. “Re-Reading” Dassonville II: The Court as Interpreter  
Die-hard apostles of the orthodox reading of Dassonville may still not be convinced. But 
unbeknownst to our “theologians” of European law, the Belgian legislation from Dassonville was 
subject to a second judicial analysis. For only two years following the first judgment, the 
Commission felt that Belgium had not sufficiently adjusted its legislation on foreign designations 
of origin in light of the Dassonville judgment and started an administrative investigation under 
Article 258 TFEU.173 The latter ultimately led to Commission v Belgium (Dassonville II),174 
which offers a fascinating “controlling” device to the contextual and “doctrinal” interpretation of 
Dassonville set out in the previous section. For even if Dassonville II is not a perfect replica, it 
still offers no support – whatsoever – to a “radical” reading of the Dassonville formula.  
Let us therefore, in line with the structure and composition of Sections 2-5, explore the legal 
environment, the arguments of the parties as well as the judicial text(s) in turn. 
a. Legal Environment and Arguments of the Parties 
Since Dassonville I, two developments had potentially changed the legal environment governing 
designations of origin in Belgium. One was an amendment to the 1934 Belgian legislation; the 
other concerned a change in French (!) customs law resulting from an international treaty with 
Great Britain.  
With regard to the relevant Belgian legislation, nothing ever seemed straightforward. Belgium 
had tried to amend it by means of a 1976 Ministerial Decree so as to comply with Dassonville I; 
and the wording of Article 1 here was this: 
The following shall be treated as accompanied at the time of customs clearance by the 
document provided for in Article 1 of the Royal Decree No 57 of 20 December 1934 on spirits: 
1. Spirits bearing a designation of origin and imported directly from the country of origin in 
containers intended for sale to consumers, provided that: 
(a) the closure of the container is automatically rendered unusable on opening and bears the 
name or registered trade-mark of the manufacturer; 
(b) the label on the container carries the following particulars in clearly legible print: 
                                                     
171  Ibid., para.13. 
172  Ibid., para.15. 
173  A copy of the “Avis Motive” can be found in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de procedure original: 
affaire 2/78 (CJUE-2123), 30 et seq. 
174  Case 2/78, Commission v Belgium, [1979] ECR 1761. Importantly: this is a post-Cassis case, which was decided on 
16.5.1979 – that is nearly three months after the Cassis judgment of 20. 2.1979. 
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— ‘bottled in the country of origin’; 
— the name or registered trademark and address of the manufacturer. 
2. Spirits bearing a designation or origin, other than those referred to in paragraph (1) above, 
imported from a Member State of the [EU], provided that they are accompanied by one of the 
following official documents: 
(a) the document relating to the product, issued by the authorities of the country of origin, 
certifying the right to the designation of origin; 
(b) the copy or photocopy of the document referred to in subparagraph (a) above certified as a 
true copy of the original by the authorities of the exporting country, provided that those 
authorities state on the copy or the photocopy of the document of origin the quantity of spirits 
exported to Belgium if this differs from the quantity stated in the original document; 
(c) a document relating to the product issued by the authorities of the exporting country 
certifying the right to the designation of origin.175 
The Ministerial Decree thus eliminated the requirement of possessing a certificate of authenticity 
for direct imports; yet it still required such a document for indirect imports – even when coming 
from a Member State of the European Union. And in its Article 258 proceedings against Belgium, 
the Commission therefore argued that the new Belgian legislation (still) violated Article 34 
because it formally discriminated between direct and indirect imports by making indirect imports 
in free circulation in the Union “subject to more onerous conditions than those referred to in 
Article 1(1) of the [Ministerial Decree]”.176 It consequently requested that the Belgian legislation 
“be amended so that a uniform system is established for the importation into Belgium of the 
products in question from other Member States, whether or not the products are imported directly 
from the country of origin”.177 
Belgium accepted this argument in 1978, when it repealed the 1976 amendment.178 And this – 
ironically – meant however that by the time Dassonville II was decided, the Belgian law in 
existence was the original 1934 Royal Decree on certificates of origin! Belgium nevertheless 
claimed that the provisions of the 1934 law had been subject to a much more flexible 
“administrative” interpretation. This flexibility was said to be the result of a number of 
administrative “circulars”, whose effect was described as follows: 
(a) Elimination of the requirement of a statement of the name of a Belgian consignee in the 
certificate of origin. 
(b) Acceptance of certificates issued by the United Kingdom authorities for countries other 
than Belgium. 
                                                     
175  Arrête Ministériel du 2 Décembre 1976 Précisant les Eaux-de-vie qui Peuvent être considérées comme étant 
accompagnées du document prévu a l’Article 1er de l’Arrête Royal N°57 du Décembre 1934 relatif aux eaux-de-
vie. The latter can be found in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de procedure original: affaire 2/78 
(CJUE-2123), 40. 
176  Dassonville II (supra n.174) – Facts and Issues, 1766. 
177  Ibid., 1768. 
178  This happened on 27 February 1978 through the “Arrête Ministériel Abrogeant l’Arrête Ministériel du 2 Décembre 
1976 Précuisant les Eaux-de-Vie qui peuvent être considérées comme étant accompagnées du Document prévu à 
l’article 1er de l’Arrête Royal N°57 du 20 Décembre 1934 relatif aux Eaux-de-Vie”. The document can be found 
in: Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Dossier de procedure original: affaire 2/78 (CJUE-2123), 66. 
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(c) Abolition of the rejection at the frontier of consignments of spirits bearing a designation 
but submitted without the necessary document and provision of opportunity for importers of 
one or more periods in order to obtain the document.179 
These administrative changes in the Belgium legal order were complemented by a second change 
– this time regarding the international legal environment. For after Dassonville I was decided, 
France and the United Kingdom had concluded a bilateral agreement “concerning the reciprocal 
protection of French designations of origin and the designation of ‘Scotch Whisky’”, which inter 
alia stated that – henceforth - “[t]he Government of the French Republic also requires, subject to 
its obligations under [European] law, that all importations of Scotch Whisky into French territory 
be accompanied by certificates, issued by the competent British authorities, that testify their 
origin and age”.180 France had thereby chosen to implement this new international obligation by 
means of a 1976 French Customs Circular, which – ironically – now also required imports of 
Scotch Whisky to be accompanied by a British Customs Certificate. And, irony of ironies, like 
the Belgian authorities had originally demanded, the British customs certificate had to be 
specifically issued for the French market! 
b. Re-Enter the “Court”: Advocate-General Opinion and Judgment 
Would these national and international changes in the legal regime governing designations of 
origin lead to a different judicial result than the one in Dassonville I? 
Advocate-General Reischl did not think so. For him, there remained four formal and substantive 
problems. First, he dismantled the argument that because France had followed the Belgian 
“example”, this would in any way influence the analysis: “[T]he Commission’s interest in a 
declaration of infringement of the Treaty does not fall away simply because other Member States 
have rules similar to the rules in question”.181 Second, the legal regime examined by Dassonville 
II was for him the same as in Dassonville I.182 Thirdly, the Advocate-General doubted that an 
administrative circular was enough to adjust the – formal – Belgian legislation.183 And, finally, 
he still thought that the Belgian rules made the (parallel) importation of goods in free circulation 
within the Union, while no longer impossible, more difficult.184 The ratio of Dassonville I had 
thus remained the same: 
                                                     
179  Dassonville II (supra n.174) – Facts and Issues, 1772. 
180  Décret n° 75-1086 du 12 novembre 1975 portant publication de l’échange de lettres des 31 juillet et 11 septembre 
1975 entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne concernant la protection réciproque d’appellations d’origine française 
et de l’application «Scotch Whisky» available here: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?id=JO 
RFTEXT000000500869.  
181  Dassonville II – Opinion of Advocate-General Reischl, 1791. 
182  Ibid, 1792: “In my view, therefore, the problem which confronts us today is basically no different from the question 
which the Court had to decide in the reference for a preliminary ruling in the case of Dassonville.” 
183  Ibid., 1793. 
184  Ibid., 1794: “Finally, the fact remains that an importer who does not import the foods directly from the country of 
origin and cannot produce a certificate of origin cannot sell the relevant products under Article 1 of the Royal 
Decree No 57 until he is in a position to produce a certificate of origin. As the Commission rightly points out, it 
makes no difference in this respect whether the goods are stopped at the frontier or remain unsold in a dealer’s 
warehouse until the document is obtained. Above all, however, the intermediary in another Member State who re-
exports only part of the goods in question cannot reasonably be expected to part with the original of the certificate 
of origin. In contrast to the repealed Arrêté Ministériel of 2 December 1976, Article 17 in conjunction with Article 
6 of the circular to the Belgian customs officials of 4 August 1978 again expressly stipulates that customs officials 
may accept only original certificates and must reject photocopies.” 
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The requirement by a Member State of a certificate of authenticity which is less easily 
obtainable by importers of an authentic product which has been put into free circulation in a 
regular manner in another Member State than by importers of the same product coming directly 
from the country of origin constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative 
restriction as prohibited by the Treaty.185 
This re-confirmation of the – limited – ratio decidendi of Dassonville hardly squares with any 
radical “neoliberal” interpretation of Article 34. And what should come to astonish – if not 
bewilder – the believers of the “Dassonville revolution”, the Court did not even hold that this 
narrow ratio was fulfilled in the present case.186 On the contrary, it found that the Belgian law did 
no longer violate Article 34; and more surprisingly still, it did not even quote the Dassonville 
formula!187 
What line of reasoning did the Court adopt? It started by (re)presenting its Dassonville I 
judgment;188 and here focused on paragraph 6 – not paragraph 5 – of that judgment.189 The Court 
thus insisted that “[t]he essential question” was whether the Belgian measures were “unreasonable 
in that they [were] disproportionate” in relation to the objective of guaranteeing the authenticity 
of the product. 190  Importantly, the Court underlined that it was not reviewing the 
unreasonableness of the Belgian requirement of a certificate of origin as such – perhaps because 
this ultimately depended on whether or not third-county goods were involved – and held: 
[I]t is for the Court to settle not the question as to which method of checking authenticity is the 
most effective, but rather the question whether the method adopted by the Belgian Government, 
the effectiveness of which is not questioned and which is based on the examination of 
certificates of origin issued in the exporting Member State, causes a trader, who wishes to 
import into Belgium from a Member State other than that of origin spirits bearing a 
designation of origin, difficulties in obtaining certificates which are unreasonable in relation 
to those which that State imposes on a direct importer [.]191 
Put differently: the Court was not interested in the reasonableness of a certificate of origin as such; 
but rather whether the Belgian requirement was unreasonable in relation to goods not directly 
coming from the producer State. Dassonville I had thought that this was the case; yet in light of 
the administrative changes subsequently introduced by the Belgian customs authorities, the 
                                                     
185  Ibid., 1789. 
186  Importantly, the Dassonville II Court was – with regard to its judicial composition – almost the same Court as the 
Dassonville I Court. While not a Full Court judgment but only a chamber judgment with seven judges, five of the 
Dassonville I judges were nevertheless also present in the deliberation to Dassonville II, namely: H. Kutscher, J. 
Mertens de Wilmars, Lord Mackenzie Stuart, P. Pescatore, and M. Sørensen. Only two new judges (A. O’Keeffe 
and G. Bosco) had since joined the Dassonville II chamber. And crucially, Lord Mackenzie Stuart acted – again – 
as the Reporting Judge in Dassonville II. 
187  One is therefore slightly at a loss, when Gormley claims in “Articles 30-36 of the E.E.C. Treaty: The cases and 
some problems, with special reference to their relationship with the Articles of the Treaty concerning competition” 
(unpublished dissertation, 1979), Part III – Section 1, 13 that in its judgment in Dassonville II the Court “repeated 
its Dassonville formula”. I could not find the formula quoted – neither in the English or French version. 
188  When characterising the ratio decidendi of Dassonville I, the Court made no reference to the “Dassonville formula” 
but makes a reference to the first “Ground” of the first judgement (Dassonville II – Judgment, para.36): “The 
requirement by a Member State of a certificate of authenticity which is less easily obtainable by importers of an 
authentic product which has been put into free circulation in a regular manner in another Member State than by 
importers of the same product coming directly from the country of origin constitutes a measure having an effect 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction as prohibited by the Treaty.” 
189  Ibid., para.37. 
190  Ibid., para.38. 
191  Ibid., para.39 (emphasis added). 
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Dassonville II Court now felt that the national measures were no longer unreasonable.192 And 
refuting the Commission’s argument that any discrimination between direct and indirect 
importers would constitute a MEEQR, the Court – surprisingly – found that the Belgian 
administrative amendments had, with regard to parallel importers, “contributed to an appreciable 
improvement in the position in relation to direct importers”;193 and it thus followed: 
[E]ven if the system for checking the authenticity of products bearing a designation of origin 
as applied by the Belgian Government involves the importer of those products into Belgium in 
more difficulties than would result from a system of sealing and labelling, that fact cannot in 
itself constitute a failure by the Kingdom of Belgium to fulfil its obligations under Article [34] 
of the Treaty… It is necessary, however, to emphasize that the Kingdom of Belgium has a duty 
to ensure … that traders wishing to import into Belgium spirits bearing a designation of 
origin … and in free circulation in a regular manner in a Member State other than that of origin 
are able to effect such imports and are not placed at a disadvantage in relation to direct 
importers, save in so far as appears reasonable and strictly necessary to ensure the authenticity 
of those products.194 
In essence: even if the Belgian system of certificates or origin – as customs formalities – would 
create more obstacles to all importers of those products than, say, a system of sealing or labelling, 
the Belgian measure was found not to violate Article 34. Unlike the view of the Commission,195 
the Court held that the change in the administrative enforcement of the 1934 Royal Decree had 
significantly transformed the latter; and it would thus fall outside the scope of Article 34 
altogether – despite the fact that it continued to be a distinctly applicable measure that should, 
theoretically, be subject to an absolute prohibition because it hindered directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially imports into Belgium. 
In (partly) overruling its earlier judgment in de Peijper,196 the Court here ceased to insist that any 
discrimination between import channels needed justification; only unreasonable discriminations 
between two importing countries would fall foul of Article 34. The Dassonville II Court was also 
no longer concerned with the treatment of third country goods in free circulation within the Union. 
Instead, the ratio decidendi of Dassonville II seemed to be that for all national measures having 
only a qualitative effect on imports, a rule of reason would apply within the scope of Article 34. 
Dassonville II can thus be seen to complete the path started by Dassonville I. For had the latter 
extended the rule of reason in International Fruit from direct to indirect imports of third-country 
goods, Dassonville II now extended that rule of reason to all qualitative restrictions on imports – 
including imports of Member State goods. 
                                                     
192  Ibid., paras.42-43. 
193  Dassonville II – Judgment, para.44. 
194  Ibid., paras.46 and 48 (emphasis added). 
195  The Commission had of course argued that the Belgian law still violated Article 34 TFEU. Compare here also the 
Commission’s answer to Written Question No 44/78, [1979] OJ C 253/4 about the complaint that France required 
certificates of origin when certain goods were imported. The Commission here held (ibid., 5): “Clearly, marking 
imports subject to the production of certificates of origin constitutes a like measure. Irrespective of the conditions 
upon which an origin certificate is issued, or the purposes for which it is required, the very fact of requiring it 
constitutes a formality liable to make the importation of products subject to it more difficult, and hence, is capable 
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[Union] trade. A certificate or origin required for 
products originating in the [Union] or for products originating in non-member countries, but in free circulation, 
constitutes a formality which is incompatible with the rules set out in Article [34] et seq. of the Treaty.” 
196  Case 104/75, de Peijper, Managing Director of Centrafarm BV, [1976] ECR 613.  
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Conclusion 
What is the best possible “meaning” of Dassonville – a case decided a few years after the end of 
the transitional period established for the internal market by the Rome Treaty, and long before 
the Single European Act? What was the Dassonville formula intended to “mean”; and how did 
the Court want it to be “understood”? 
This EUI Working Paper has tried to offer some – preliminary – answers to these questions. It 
will be recalled that on a textual level, the Dassonville formula suggests that all national laws that 
“directly or indirectly, actually or potentially” hinder trade would fall within the scope of Article 
34; and that they would therefore, prima facie, be prohibited under European law. This radical 
“national” understanding of the internal market however encounters major problems when the 
judgment is placed in its historical context. For once this is done, it seems absolutely implausible 
that the normative and legal vocabulary of the time allowed the Court to even “think” in “national” 
categories. Dassonville, historically reconstructed, must rather be seen against the background of 
the Court’s past jurisprudence on the status of third-county goods in the customs union and its 
treatment of “mixed situations”, that is: situations in which private parties try to use national laws 
to restrict parallel trade. 
What about Dassonville’s “illocutionary force”? What was the Court hoping to “do” for the future 
in deciding the case? The move from the Second Chamber to the Full Court suggests that the 
Court felt that this was an important judgment; yet why did it feel so? The principal answer 
suggested above was that the use of the Dassonville formula allowed the Court to signal – from 
the perspective of Article 34 – the existence of a doctrinal bridge between the free movement of 
goods provisions and the competition law rules. This bridge was the “pattern of trade” test that 
clarified, now for both parts of the Treaty, that public laws or private agreements that affected – 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially – imports or exports within the common market could 
be judicially reviewed in the Union legal order. For Article 34 this specifically meant that the 
Court could analyse restrictions on parallel imports because the provision would cover 
quantitative as well as qualitative restrictions of intra-Union trade.197 The Court’s primary intent 
was thus, in essence, to provide an – abstract – definition of MEEQR that would offer a judicial 
pass-partout; yet that would also confirm (!) the general-yet-GATT-consistent definition of 
MEEQR previously offered by the Commission.198 
This “author-centric” contextual interpretation of the judgment contrasts – strikingly – with the 
orthodox reading that sees the Dassonville formula as offering a hyper-liberal definition of the 
internal market that radically dissociated itself from all conceptual shackles generally accepted in 
classic international trade law. While this is what the formula eventually came to mean today – 
after a complex reception history that will be discussed elsewhere;199 the idea that the Dassonville 
Court was inspired by “a certain Jacobean conception of the common market-place” that 
“explicitly or implicitly rejects the GATT philosophy” by denying the Member States “wide 
regulatory autonomy, which really has as its implicit ideal type a transnational market-place 
which is identical to a national market-place”, 200 is utter historical nonsense that must be rejected 
as a complete “philosophical” folly. And while this Working Paper did not explore the immediate 
post-Dassonville context in detail to further strengthen this point, at least one case – Dassonville 
                                                     
197  Commenting on the parallelism between the free movement provisions and the competition law provisions, Barents 
therefore rightly noted that “the concurrence between the jurisprudence on both groupings of provisions constitutes 
a logical consequence of the principle of unity of the (common) market”, see: R. Barents, New Developments in 
Measures Having Equivalent Effect, (1981) 18 Common Market Law Review 271 at 274. 
198  On the idea that the Court here indeed “confirmed” the Commission view, see: R. Schütze, Framing Dassonville 
(supra n.16), Chapters 2 and 4. 
199  Ibid., Chapters 4 and 5. 
200  J. H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (supra n.2), 215. 
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II – was discussed to show that even regardless of what the Dassonville I judges subjectively 
intended, their subsequent judgments simply do not confirm to the ultra-liberal view. 
What does this all mean for the “meaning and understanding of European law”? Two 
methodological conclusions can be drawn. First of all, each generation of European integration 
scholars should “re-read” the classics and discover their meaning for itself. Previous readings – 
including this one – must always be critically tested; for simply to accept an “orthodox” 
interpretation that is “given to us” by the past “authorities” is to engage in religious not academic 
thinking. Importantly, this conclusion is not meant to “postmodernistically” challenge the idea of 
meaning at all; because it unconditionally accept that there are – better – reconstructions than 
others; yet it unconditionally challenges the “positivist” fallacy that the meaning of a legal 
provision – like that of any text – is permanent and intransient. To quote Quentin Skinner one last 
time: 
As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into 
believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our 
intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them. Given this situation, one of the 
contributions that historians can make is to offer us a kind of exorcism. If we approach the past 
with a willingness to listen, with a commitment to trying to see things their way, we can hope 
to prevent ourselves from becoming readily bewitched.201 
Alas, sapere aude! But to dare means to challenge (and criticise), and to challenge requires 
courage and time – two essential and “critical” elements that seem to be in short supply “these 
days” in European constitutional law scholarship.202 
But there is also an important – and much more positive – second conclusion for European law 
and lawyers: the interpretation of classic cases cannot be left to historians and sociologists alone. 
While the historical and sociological work done by – to name just two brilliant colleagues and 
friends – Morten Rasmussen and Antoine Vauchez is mesmerising,203 the best way to arrive at an 
“understanding” of what the European Court as a judicial actor is doing is to analyse the judicial 
moves that it makes. Law, as an order of legal rules and principles, is a discipline that exercises 
discipline on its actors. A history of European law must therefore, in addition to its “external” and 
“contextual” dimensions, always take account of the “internal” judicial perspective. Every 
judicial decision will always have a doctrinal context, which is itself surrounded by a broader 
legal, sociological and political context. The study of “law in context” must thus mean a study in 
contextualised “law” because a legal order constitutes a “system” that has its own context-
independent internal logic. The “new history of European law” must therefore be an 
interdisciplinary project that takes the “law” – and its “moves” and “games” – seriously. 
With the historical archives of the European Court now open to academic interlocutors, the 
“classics” of European law are bound to experience a “renaissance” – and what historically more 
appropriate setting than Florence! Let us hope that a re-birth and re-reading of the classics of 
European law will soon follow – a re-reading that will hopefully leave all conventional-yet-
                                                     
201  Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics – Volume 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6. 
202  The criticism holds particularly true for EU constitutional theory scholarship, where it has become fashionable in 
the past twenty years to engage in a cyclical revisiting of the past secondary literature and where past “authorities” 
are combined and re-combined, criticised and re-criticised, cited and re-cited; and in which the tertiary literature 
derived from that stale process of abstract commentary then becomes itself the subject of study for the next 
generation of constitutional “theorists”.  
203  The work on Van Gend and Costa that Professors Rasmussen and Vauchez have done is fascinating; and excellent 
illustrations of their respective research programmes can be found here, see: M. Rasmussen, Revolutionizing 
European law: A history of the Van Gend en Loos judgment, (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
136; and A. Vauchez, Brokering Europe: Euro-Layers and the Making of a Transnational Polity (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) – with references to Vauchez’s earlier work. 
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mistaken “orthodoxies” of the past behind. For in these uncertain times of crisis after crisis, the 
future direction of the European Union may well be decided; and in order to evaluate and 
comprehend the various “futures” on offer, to see where we come from and where we are going, 
we need to better understand the past. A return to the classics here promises liberation from the 
“medieval” thinking offered by today’s high priests of European law. Stuck in their “old” ways 
and believing the past to be the present, these “philosophical” – and often: pop-philosophical – 
authorities do not help but hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially a vital re-reading 
and re-imaging of the European Union in its past, present and future. 
  
 
